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1.

INTRODUCTION

Protection of shareholders under international law has been the
subject of much controversy among scholars.1 Since a large part of
* Gabriel Bottini is the Coordinator of the International Department of the Solicitor General's Office of the Argentine Republic, which is in charge of the defense of the country before international arbitral tribunals. He teaches international law at the University of Buenos Aires and at the University of Palermo in
Argentina, and at other international institutions. Mr. Bottini has published extensively on issues of international law and has participated as a speaker in many
events related to international investment law held in different countries of the
world. The views expressed herein are of the Author and do not necessarily represent those of the Solicitor General's Office of the Argentine Republic.
1 See, e.g., Lucius CAFLISCH, LA PROTECTION DES SOCIT-ES COMMERCIALES ET DES
INTtRtTS INDIRECTS EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1969) (discussing the tension
between the concept of nationality and the rights of foreign investors under international law); Yoram Dinstein, Diplomatic Protection of Companies Under International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF

ERIC SuY 505 (Karel Wellens ed., 1998) (contending that in order to protect the
property of foreigners in an era of increased global investment, the nationality of
foreign subsidiaries should be the same as the parent company's nationality for
purposes of diplomatic protection); Vaughan Lowe, Shareholders Rights to Control
and Manage: From Barcelona Traction to ELSI, in 1 LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU
ODA 269 (Nisuke Ando, Edward McWhinney & Rtidiger Wolfrum eds., 2002) (noting the importance of Judge Oda's separate opinion in the ELSI case, in which he
narrowly construed the rights of U.S. shareholders in an Italian company to be no
greater than rights guaranteed under Italian law); IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN,
CORPORATIONS IN AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 109-22 (1987) (noting that "inter-

State enterprises" lack an international personality and therefore to protect individual property interests it is necessary to "lift the corporate veil" by allowing a
partner State to espouse a claim according to its citizens' share in the enterprise);
Alessandra Gianelli, La Protezione Diplomatica di Societa Dopo la Sentenza Concernente la Barcelona Traction, LXIX RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 762 (1986);
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foreign investment is channeled through local companies, the issue
has always been whether such investment can be protected
through international procedures even when the company in ques2
tion is not itself a foreign investor.
Whenever the host state adopts measures that directly affect
shareholders' rights, such as the right to receive any declared dividend or to participate in shareholders meetings, it is undisputed
that under international law either the shareholder, if it has direct
access to an international procedure, or its national state through
diplomatic protection, will have standing to claim against the

Rosalyn Higgins, Aspects of the Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Company, Ltd., 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 327 (1971) (providing background information and discussion of the key issues and reasoning in the Barcelona Traction case);
Eduardo Jim~nez de Ar6chaga, Diplomatic Protectionof Shareholders in International
Law, 4 PHIL. INT'L L.J. 71 (1965) (exploring the treatment of shareholder claims by
international law and international tribunals' relating to diplomatic protection);
Richard B. Lillich, EditorialComment: Two Perspectives on the Barcelona Traction Case,
65 AM. J. INT'L L. 522 (1971) (critiquing the judgment in the Barcelona Traction case
for the court's determination of the customary international law rule governing
the case); Francis A. Mann, The Protectionof Shareholders' Interests in the Light of the
Barcelona Traction Case, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 259 (1973) (attempting to grasp the full
impact of the Barcelona Traction decision by providing further analysis of the case
to supplement a previous summary by Herbert W. Briggs); Stanley D. Metzger,
Editorial Comment: Nationality of Corporate Investment under Investment Guarantee
Schemes - The Relevance of Barcelona Traction, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 532 (1971) (examining the Barcelona Traction case with regards to whether, in the absence of a special
international agreement, dominant shareholders of a corporation could be protected by their governments in formal claims proceedings even though the corporation itself was incorporated in another nation); Sean D. Murphy, The ELSI Case:
An Investment Dispute at the International Court of Justice, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 391
(1991) (construing the ELSI case as reaffirming the shareholder protections afforded by bilateral treaties despite the adverse holding against the United States);
Manuel Diez de Velasco, La Protection Diplomatique des Socidtds et des Actionnaires,
141 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE LA HAYE [R.C.A.D.I.] 93 (1974); Francisco
Orrego Vicufia, Changing Approaches to the Nationality of Claims in the Context of
DiplomaticProtection and InternationalDispute Settlement, 15 ICSID REVIEW- FOREIGN
INV. L.J. 340 (2000) (arguing that modern trends in international law point toward
a broadening of individual rights for foreign national shareholders); Stephen A.
Kubiatowski, Note, The Case of Elettronica Sicula S.p.A.: Toward Greater Protection
of Shareholders' Rights in Foreign Investments, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 215 (1991)
(concluding that despite rejecting U.S. claims on the merits, the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ"), in ELSI, preserved bilateral treaties as protections for foreign shareholders).
2 For a reference to this concern in the context of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") Convention, see Aron Broches, The
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, 136 RECUEIL DES COUPS DE L'ACADEMIE DE LA HAYE [R.C.A.D.I.] 331,
358-59 (1972).
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measures. 3 The problem arises, however, when the contested
measure affects only the rights of the company because, in any
event, it will generally also affect the economic interests of its
shareholders.
For the purposes of this Article, an indirect claim (or an indirect
action) 4 is defined as a claim in which a shareholder requests compensation for damages resulting from a measure that was directed
exclusively against the rights of the company in which it holds
shares. As will become readily apparent, however, one of the most
difficult tasks in this domain is determining whose rights are the
ones really affected, notwithstanding the allegation of the shareholder-claimant (who will always argue that it is invoking its own
rights and not those of the company).
The last several years have witnessed an important growth in
the exercise of indirect actions before arbitral tribunals constituted
under the auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), an evolution that is directly related
to the recourse to ICSID pursuant to the provisions of a Bilateral
Investment Treaty ("BIT"). This is because whilst when the arbitration is brought under a BIT shareholders can frequently rely on
broad definitions of protected investments, 5 when the case is
brought invoking a clause that provides for ICSID jurisdiction in
an investment agreement, such action will typically have been initiated by the company party to the contract and not by its shareholders.
Recourse to ICSID arbitration under a BIT, although a much extended phenomenon nowadays, is also a relatively recent one. 6
3 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 3, para. 7 (Feb. 5) [hereinafter Barcelona Traction] (establishing cited
case law); see also Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Rep. Guinea v. Dem.
Rep. Congo), 2007 I.C.J. 103, para. 64 (May 24) [hereinafter Diallo Case] (analyzing
direct shareholders' rights).
4 The expression "derivative claim" is given the same meaning in this Article
as the expression "indirect claim," notwithstanding the meaning of both concepts
under domestic legal systems.
5 BITs typically have long lists of protected investments including broad references to "every kind of asset .... ." See Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve
Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Rep. Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 113 (Nov. 14, 2005), availableat http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC523_En
&caseld=C27.
6 See Antoine Goetz v. Rep. of Burundi (Burundi), ICSID Case No.
ARB/95/3, Award, 6 ICSID Rep. 3, para. 67 (Feb. 10, 1999) [hereinafter Goetz]
(stating that the present case is only the second of its kind).
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That explains why the issue of indirect actions generally did not
have to be dealt with by the first ICSID tribunals ruling on investment disputes.
Although in principle indirect actions are beneficial for foreign
investors, who increase their chances of bringing claims against
measures that affect their investments, they also involve serious legal complexities. Perhaps the most acute is the possibility of double recovery since, if under different legal theories it is established
that the same measure having one economic impact affects both
the rights of the company and the rights of the shareholders, the
state that adopted the measure could theoretically be required to
pay compensation to the latter and to the former.
Another concern raised by indirect claims is related to the interrelationship between the rights and the obligations derived from
a specific investment. If shareholders are going to be allowed to, in
essence, exercise the rights of the local company (if not formally, in
terms of the expected economic benefits of the investment),
shouldn't they also be required to comply with the obligations that
the local company acquired in relation to the investment (for example, the obligation to submit all disputes exclusively to local
courts)? If the shareholder is going to directly receive compensation for a measure affecting the revenues of the local company,
shouldn't it be liable for at least some of the obligations of the local
company that were related to the affected revenues?
The following Section of this Article discusses the admissibility
of indirect claims under the ICSID Convention. After considering
the provisions of the ICSID Convention and its travaux preparatoires, it concludes by affirming that indirect claims are outside
ICSID's jurisdiction, in accordance with the intention of the states
which are parties to the ICSID Convention. Section 3 considers the
three cases of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") that have
delved into the issue of the jus standi of shareholders under customary international law and under a specific treaty. This Section
demonstrates that the position that the ICJ adopted in the first case,
distinguishing between measures that affect shareholders' rights
and measures that only affect their interests (because they are
adopted in respect of the company's rights), is still the position that
it holds today. It also shows that the attempt by some arbitral tribunals to disregard the findings of the ICJ as applicable only in the
context of diplomatic protection -and not when a BIT is invoked is not well founded. The discussion as to what are the rights of a
shareholder in a given case is essentially the same in both scenar-
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ios, independent of who will pursue the claim -the shareholder itself (if possible) or the state of its nationality.
Section 4 analyzes the jurisprudence of ICSID Tribunals as to
their competence and as to ICSID's jurisdiction over indirect
claims. It examines the first ICSID cases to consider derivative
claims, and then gives particular consideration to the arbitral decisions arising from the cases brought against Argentina following
the explosion of its economic and political crisis. In light of a jurisdictional objection advanced by Argentina as to the lack of standing of shareholders, these last cases have produced a considerable
jurisprudence on indirect claims. Although the vast majority of the
cases have accepted the admissibility of what in fact were indirect
claims as defined here, the grounds for those decisions are not always consistent and some exhibit serious deficiencies and lacunae.
These deficiencies and lacunae are discussed when considering
each of the decisions. This Section ends by analyzing an ICSID
case that recognized the importance of determining which company actually concluded the contract on which the claim was
based. The Tribunal in this last case decided that the case was inadmissible because it had not been brought by the party to the contract, notwithstanding the links between the latter and the claimant.
Section 5 concludes by discussing some of the legal and policy
problems posed by the exercise of indirect claims. It argues that
these problems can be resolved through an express regulation of
indirect claims, which inter alia establishes the requirements for
their exercise, as in fact it has been done within the context of certain international dispute resolution systems. Within reasonable
confines, the exercise of indirect claims can continue to be one of
the ways in which foreign investment is protected, without leading
to unfair situations that can be created by their indiscriminate use.
2.

THE ICSID CONVENTION

According to Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, the jurisdiction of ICSID extends to:
any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or
agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by
that State) and a national of another Contracting State,
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which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to sub7
mit to the Centre.
This provision establishes the "outer limits" of ICSID jurisdiction, which cannot be extended even with the consent of both par8
ties to the dispute.
The jurisdiction of ICSID as an international legal person 9
should not be confused with the competence of arbitral tribunals
formed under ICSID rules, which are subject to the parties' disposition. Under the ICSID Convention, the jurisdiction of ICSID
"mean[s] the limits within which the provisions of the Convention
will apply and the facilities of the Centre will be available for conciliation and arbitration proceedings." 10
Arbitral tribunals have construed Article 25 of the ICSID Convention as requiring the existence of a dispute between a state
party and a national of another state party, that the dispute is a legal dispute, and that it arises directly out of an investment." Often
the problem arises when the party to the contract that constitutes
the main investment is a local company-albeit with foreign
shareholders - so that the nationality criterion will not be met since
any dispute that arises will be between the host state and one of its
nationals.12
For the purposes of this Article, the crucial question is whether
ICSID's jurisdiction covers indirect claims by shareholders. In this
7 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 25 (1), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
[hereinafter ICSID Convention].
8 Aron Broches, Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties and Arbitration of Investment Disputes, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION 63, 67 (Jan C. Schultsz & Albert Jan
van den Berg eds., 1982).
9 See ICSID Convention, supra note 7, art. 18, U.N.T.S. 159 (giving the Centre
"full international legal personality").
10 Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, para. 22 (Mar. 18,
1965), reprinted in International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES 38, 43 (2006) [hereinafter Report of the
Executive Directors].
11 See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 74 (Feb. 22, 2006), available at http://icsid
.worldbank.org/ICSID/index.jsp [hereinafter Continental Jurisdiction].
12 See Broches, supra note 2, at 358-59 (describing the potential need for foreign shareholders in a locally incorporated company to specifically contract for
the right to bring ICSID claims, as they may not automatically fall under the jurisdiction of ICSID).
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respect, as will be seen, it is not disputed that shareholdings are
covered by the term "investment" included in Article 25(1) of the
ICSID Convention, even if such shareholdings are indirect-in
other words, held through other companies-and non13
controlling.
During the negotiations of the text of the ICSID Convention,
drafters considered the possibility of granting a direct action to
controlling shareholders of local companies. Many foreign investors operate through a local company -either because it is required
by the host state or because it is the company's own choice; thus, if
direct action was not provided, the investors would be left out of
the coverage of the ICSID Convention if the company holder of the
final investment-for example a concession contract-was a national of the host state. 14 In this respect, it was maintained that a
great part of foreign investment would have been excluded from
the ICSID Convention's scope if it were not for the solution after15
wards adopted.
However, the possibility of granting controlling shareholders
of local companies direct access to ICSID's facilities in respect of
rights of the local company was entirely rejected. In this respect,
Professor Schreuer explains that: "A suggested solution to give access to dispute settlement not to the locally incorporated company
16
but directly to its foreign owners was discarded."
Instead, the alternative prescribed by Article 25(2)(b) in fine was
included. Under this provision, a local company, controlled by a
foreign owner, is given the right to sue its own state, provided that
the parties had agreed that the local company should be treated as

13 See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 7 ICSID
Rep. 494, paras. 51-52 (July 17, 2003) [hereinafter CMS Jurisdiction] ("There is indeed no requirement that an investment, in order to qualify [for ICSID jurisdiction], must necessarily be made by shareholders controlling a company or owning
the majority of its shares").
14 See CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 29091 (2001) [hereinafter ICSID COMMENTARY] (discussing the preliminary draft of the
convention and the debate that surrounded the possibility of granting a direct
right of action for controlling shareholders).
15 See Broches, supra note 2, at 359 ("If no exception were made for foreignowned but locally incorporated companies, a large and important sector of foreign investment would be outside the scope of the Convention.").
16 ICSID COMMENTARY, supra note 14, at 291 (internal citations omitted).
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a "national of another Contracting State" due to its foreign control.17

The travaux prdparatoiresof the ICSID Convention, and even its
actual text-in particular Article 25(2)(b) in fine-show that, outside of the possibility created by this latter provision, actions by
shareholders based upon the rights of the company in which they
hold shares are incompatible with the ICSID Convention. If the
drafters of the ICSID Convention considered and rejected the possibility of extending ICSID's jurisdiction to such claims, this jurisdiction cannot now be extended in order to include them, not even
through a treaty. Except, of course, if the treaty amends the ICSID
Convention under Articles 65 and 66.
It has been stated that the mechanism enshrined in Article
18
25(2)(b) in fine is "only an alternative for very specific purposes"
that:
is precisely meant to facilitate agreement between the parties, so as not to have the corporate personality interfering
with the protection of the real interests associated with the
investment. The same result can be achieved by means of
the provisions of the BIT, where the consent may include
non-controlling or minority shareholders. 19
But if the mechanism of Article 25(2)(b) in fine is "only an alternative," this raises the question of why the drafters of the Convention saw the need to create it,20 and why commentators such as
Broches conclude that if it were not for such mechanism, a great
part of foreign investment would have been excluded from the jurisdiction of ICSID. 21 It is clear that if the mechanism of Article
25(2)(b) in fine would be "only an alternative" for the shareholder -who would be entitled to choose between this mechanism
and claiming in its own name for damages suffered by the company-had the "alternative" mechanism not been created, no foreign investment would have been excluded from the jurisdiction of
ICSID.
ICSID Convention, supra note 7 art. 25(2)(b).
18 CMS Jurisdiction, supra note 13, para. 58.
19 Id. para. 51.
20 Cf.ICSID COMMENTARY, supra note 14, at 291 (noting that the drafters considered and discarded "[a] suggested solution to give access to dispute settlement
not to the locally incorporated company but directly to its foreign owners.").
21 Id. (confirming Broches's view regarding the Article 25(2)(b) mechanism).
17
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2.1. Indirect Claims and BITs
In the case of ICSID arbitrations initiated on the basis of a BIT,
it has been argued that shareholders are not exercising indirect
claims, since they invoke rights directly granted to them. 22 In fact,
BITs generally grant to investors in shares, among many other
kinds of foreign investors, certain direct rights such as the right not
to be expropriated except for a public purpose and against adequate compensation, to be treated in a fair and equitable way, to
receive full protection and security, and to be free from discriminatory or arbitrary treatment.
When the claim involves measures affecting typical shareholder rights and invokes standards of protection commonly found
in BITs, for example fair and equitable treatment, 23 there is no
doubt that the shareholder is exercising a direct claim, and thus,
ICSID has jurisdiction. The problem arises, however, when the
shareholders' claims do not seek to espouse their individual rights,
but rather the shareholders' claim is made in relation to measures
affecting rights of the company, such as measures regulating company-made contracts.
In this last case, ICSID does not have jurisdiction over the
claim. 24 Even if the shareholder claims that the measurealthough exclusively regulating the "local" rights of the company -also affected the company's BIT rights, allowing the claim
would circumvent the "outer limits" imposed on ICSID's jurisdiction by the ICSID Convention. This Convention grants foreign
owners the possibility of bringing claims against measures affecting the operations of the local company in which they hold shares,
but exclusively through the mechanism enshrined in Article

See cases cited infra Section 4.2.
See discussion infra Section 3.1; see also Agrotexim v. Greece, 330 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 23-24, para. 62 (1995) (noting that a clear distinction exists between an infringement on an individual shareholder's right and an infringement
on corporations' rights).
24 It is very important to bear in mind that the conclusions of this Article as to
the scope of ICSID's jurisdiction are based upon an interpretation of the ICSID
Convention. The fact that indirect claims, as defined herein, are outside of
ICSID's jurisdiction does not mean, in any way, that a BIT claim commenced under other arbitral rules would be inadmissible. The admissibility of such a claim
depends upon the interpretation of the applicable arbitral rules and of the applicable BIT, and even on the interpretation of general international law, if the BIT
does not depart from it as regards admissibility of shareholders' claims.
22

23
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25(2) (b) in fine; other possibilities, such as granting them direct access, were considered and discarded. 25
BITs cannot modify such limits to ICSID jurisdiction that derive
26
from the text and structure of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention,
not even by granting additional rights to shareholders that would
seem to provide, under certain interpretations, an international
protection to "local" rights that belong not to them but to the company. In any event, it is at least doubtful that treaties protecting
foreign investments, as a general matter and except for specific
provisions appearing in some of them, intended to allow for indirect claims before any forum.
In fact, there are treaties that provide for indirect claims, but
through specific provisions that expressly authorize shareholders
to initiate them, and that are subject to very important conditions.
For instance, the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") authorizes indirect claims in Article 1117 by controlling shareholders, but subject to certain requirements, including
the ones established in Article 1135, which provide that any compensation to be granted does not go to the shareholder but to the
27
company on behalf of which the claim was brought.
The U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement also provides for indirect
claims, under certain conditions, and it also establishes that any
compensation is to be paid to the company and not to the person
that made the claim on behalf of it.28 Finally, the 2004 Model BIT
of the United States authorizes shareholders to bring claims on be-

See ICSID COMMENTARY, supra note 14, at 290-91 ("A suggested solution to
give access to dispute settlement not to the locally incorporated company but directly to its foreign owners ...was discarded.").
26 See Broches, supra note 8, at 67 (stating that any agreement that provides
for jurisdiction beyond Article 25's established limits "will have no effect").
27 North American Free Trade Agreement, ch. 11, arts. 1117, 1135, U.S.-Can.Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). Cases have also discussed the issue of
indirect or derivative claims under NAFTA. See Gami Invs., Inc. v. United Mex.
States, Final Award, NAFTA/UNCITRAL Case, paras. 26-43 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.
Trib. Nov. 15, 2004), availableat http://www.state.gov/s/l/c7119.htm [hereinafter
Gami Final Award] (analyzing the issues of jurisdiction and standing under
NAFTA); Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3,
Award, 6 ICSID Rep. 192, 210-13, paras. 76-86 (Oct. 11, 2002) (examining the issue
of standing under NAFTA).
28 U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, art. 10.25(2), June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026
(2003).
25
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half of an enterprise they control, 29 provided they submit "the
claimant's and the enterprise's written waivers of any right to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court under
the law of either party, or other dispute settlement procedures, any
proceeding with respect to any measure alleged to constitute a
breach," 30 and an award of damages "shall provide that the sum be
31
paid to the enterprise."
These provisions are strong evidence that when the states intend to allow for indirect claims of shareholders, they do so expressly. A different interpretation would render such provisions
superfluous, a result which is contrary to basic principles of treaty
32
construction.
Further, the position under customary international law is clear
as to the inadmissibility of claims by or on behalf of a shareholder
in relation to damages suffered by the corporation. 33 Since "an
important principle of customary international law should [not] be
held to have been tacitly dispensed with, [by an international
agreement,] in the absence of any words making clear an intention
to do so," 34 the admissibility of indirect claims should be expressly
provided for to allow a Tribunal's acceptance.
Under these principles, the fact that shares are among the protected investments in a BIT is far from enough evidence to admit
indirect claims. BITs do not, for example, allow a shareholder to
claim under the fair and equitable treatment provision against a
measure having an impact on the revenues of the company, unless
they say so expressly.

29 U.S. Dep't of State & USTR, U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art.
24.1(b) (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710
.pdf.
30 Id. art. 26.2(b)(ii).
31 Id. art. 34.2(b).

32 Compare the position of the United States in relation to Articles 1116, 1117
and 1139 of NAFTA in its submission pursuant to Article 1120 of NAFTA in Gami
Final Award, supra note 27, paras. 2-5.
33 See, e.g., Diallo Case, supra note 3, para. 89 (expressing the Court's opinion
that state practice and international court decisions do not reveal an exception to
customary international law allowing for protection of shareholders by substitution).
34 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 42 (July 20)
[hereinafter ELSI].
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THE ICJ CASES

3.1. Barcelona Traction
In the Barcelona Traction case, the Belgian government was
claiming against certain measures of the Spanish government
which, allegedly in violation of international law, had caused damage to the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited
(Barcelona Traction). 35 Belgium was seeking reparation for such
damage, as sustained by shareholders of Barcelona Traction who
were Belgian nationals 36 and who, according to Belgium, con37
trolled the company.
Barcelona Traction had been incorporated in 1911 in Toronto,
Canada, 38 where it had its registered office. 39 In light of Barcelona
Traction's place of incorporation, one of Spain's four preliminary
objections "was to the effect that the claim is inadmissible because
the Belgian Government lacks any jus standi to intervene or make a
judicial claim on behalf of Belgian interests in a Canadian company." 40 It should be noted that, in order to develop its electric
power production and distribution system in Catalonia, Spain,
Barcelona Traction had formed a number of subsidiary companies
in Canada and Spain, some of which were concession-holders. 41
The measures complained of had been taken in relation to Barcelona Traction and not to the Belgian shareholders. 42 Therefore,
the Court considered it:
essential to establish whether the losses allegedly suffered
by Belgian shareholders in Barcelona Traction were the
consequence of the violation of obligations of which they
were the beneficiaries. In other words: has a right of Belgium been violated on account of its nationals' having suf-

Barcelona Traction, supra note 3, para. 1.
Id. para. 2.
37 Id. para. 9.
38 Id. para. 8.
39 Id. para. 30.
40 Id. para. 3.
41 Id. para. 8.
42 Id. para. 32.
35
36
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fered infringement of their rights as shareholders in a company not of Belgian nationality? 43
It is clear, then, that although the case involved an exercise of
diplomatic protection by Belgium on behalf of certain shareholders, the Court discussed which were the rights of the shareholders
and whether such rights were the subject matter of Belgium's
claim. The Court believed that this determination was necessary in
order to next establish whether Belgium's own rights had in turn
been violated.
The ICJ commenced such discussion by affirming that
"international law has had to recognize the corporate entity as an
institution created by States in a domain essentially within their
domestic jurisdiction." 44 It then stated that "[t]he concept and
structure of the company are founded on and determined by a firm
distinction between the separate entity of the company and that of
the shareholder, each with a distinct set of rights", 45 and that "[s]o
long as the company is in existence the shareholder has no right to
the corporate assets." 46 For the Court, it is only the corporate
organs that can take action in relation to matters that pertain to the
47
company.
The analysis then continued with a paragraph which is at the
crux of the Court's rejection of Belgium's jus standi:
Notwithstanding the separate corporate personality, a
wrong done to the company frequently causes prejudice to
its shareholders. But the mere fact that damage is sustained
by both company and shareholder does not imply that both
are entitled to claim compensation. Thus no legal conclusion can be drawn from the fact that the same event caused
damage simultaneously affecting several natural or juristic
persons. Creditors do not have any right to claim compensation from a person who, by wronging their debtor, causes
them loss. In such cases, no doubt, the interests of the aggrieved are affected, but not their rights. Thus whenever a
shareholder's interests are harmed by an act done to the

43 Id. para. 35.

44 Id. para. 38.
45 Id. para. 41.
46 Id.

47 Id. para. 42.
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company, it is to the latter that he must look to institute appropriate action; for although two separate entities may
have suffered from the same wrong, it is only one entity
whose rights have been infringed. 48
The Court rejected an argument which appears frequently in
investment litigation: the company is merely a means of the
shareholders, who constitute the "reality behind it" that should be
protected. 49 The ICJ affirmed that "even if a company is no more
than a means for its shareholders to achieve their economic purpose, so long as it is in esse it enjoys an independent existence."5 0
The core of the Court's argument lies in the distinction between
measures that affect the shareholders' rights and measures that affect their interests. For the Court, a measure that causes damage
does not necessarily involve the duty to make reparation.5 1 It is
not when a "mere interest [is] affected," but only when a right is
infringed that responsibility arises. 52 The Court did refer to cases
in which it is the rights of shareholders and not those of the company that are affected:
The situation is different if the act complained of is aimed
at the direct rights of the shareholder as such. It is well
known that there are rights which municipal law confers
upon the latter distinct from those of the company, including the right to any declared dividend, the right to attend
and vote at general meetings, the right to share in the residual assets of the company on liquidation. Whenever one
of his direct rights is infringed, the shareholder has an independent right of action. On this there is no disagreement
between the Parties. But a distinction must be drawn between a direct infringement of the shareholder's rights, and
difficulties or financial losses to which he may be exposed
as the result of the situation of the company. 53
The independence of companies with respect to its sharehold-

48

Id. para. 44.

49

Id. para. 45.

50

Id.

51

Id. para. 46.

52

Id.

53

Id. para. 47.
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ers is not, however, absolute. 54 In this context, the Court referred
to the concept of "'lifting the corporate veil"' or "'disregarding the
legal entity,"' which is recognized in municipal law in order to
prevent the misuse of the legal personality. 55 According to the ICJ,
such process of lifting the veil already forms part of international
law as well, and can be resorted to not only in the interest of those
dealing with the company, but also (more exceptionally) in favor of
56
the shareholders.
For the purposes of the present Article, it is important to note
that the Court, in light of the parties' submissions, left aside the issue of special "terms of instruments establishing the jurisdiction of
the tribunal or claims commission and determining what rights
might enjoy protection."5 7 Hence, although the general legal discussion contained in Barcelona Traction about the rights of shareholders is relevant for determining the admissibility of indirect
claims, it is simply the framework for interpreting the provisions of
the ICSID Convention and for determining whether the ICSID system was designed to allow such claims.
The Court considered the case in which the company has
ceased to exist, 58 but it clarified that although Barcelona Traction
was entirely paralyzed from an economic point of view, 59 it still existed from a legal point of view. 60 It is only when the company has
ceased to exist from a legal standpoint, and therefore the shareholder is deprived of any remedy through it, that the latter can institute action in respect of measures affecting the company's
61
rights.
Finally, the Court refers to new developments in international
law, which could be relevant for the issue of the admissibility of
indirect claims under the ICSID Convention. 62 However, the Court
refers specifically to the case in which the company itself is vested
with the right to present a claim against the host state-

54 Id. para. 56.
55 Id.
56 Id. paras. 57-58.

57 Id. para. 63.
58 Id. para. 64.

59 Id. para. 65.
60 Id. para. 66.
61 Id.

62 See id. para. 90 (describing the frequent practice of stipulating shareholder
terms in special agreements or treaties).
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instead of having to depend on its state of nationality espousing
the claim through diplomatic protection63 -which no doubt was
one of the main innovations of the ICSID Convention. Nevertheless, such development should not be confused with whether the
shareholder can claim damages for measures affecting the company's rights, which is a separate issue that has to be determined
independently under the provisions of the ICSID Convention.
3.2. The Elettronica Sicula Case
The Elettronica Sicula ("ELSI") case was decided by a Chamber
of the ICJ in 1989,64 almost 20 years after the decision of the Court
in Barcelona Traction. The United States instituted proceedings
against Italy "in respect of a dispute arising out of the requisition
by the Government of Italy of the plant and related assets of Raytheon-Elsi S.p.A., previously known as Elettronica Sicula S.p.A.
(ELSI), an Italian company which was stated to have been 100 per
65
cent owned by two United States corporations."
The United States alleged that certain acts and omissions of Italy had violated several provisions of the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America
and the Italian Republic of 1948 and its Supplementary Agreement. 66 The claim concerned the treatment received by the Raytheon Company (Raytheon) and The Machlett Laboratories Incorporated (Machlett), in relation to ELSI, which was wholly owned
67
by those two corporations.
Italy argued that the claim was inadmissible because local
remedies had not been exhausted, that in any event the provisions
of the treaty mentioned by the United States had not been breached
and, in subsidy and alternatively, that the alleged violations had
caused no injury. 68 However, Italy did not raise objections to the
jurisdiction of the Court, since it was "common ground between
69
the Parties that the Court ha[d] jurisdiction".
ELSI had been incorporated in Palermo, Sicily, where it pro-

66

Id. (discussing agreements directly between companies and states).
See ELSI, supra note 34, para. 1 (outlining the filing of the case).
Id. para. 1.
See id. para. 12 (explaining the United States' claim).

67

Id.

68

See id. para. 11 (explicating Italy's defense claims).
Id. para. 48.

63
64
65

69
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duced electronic components. 70 After several years of a continuous
decline, by 1967 ELSI was facing a financial crisis, 71 which eventually led the Mayor of Palermo to requisition ELSI's plant on April
1, 1968.72 The goal of the requisition was to avoid the serious consequences for the workers and the impact on the public opinion
73
and the press that closing the plant would have.
However, the company was declared bankrupt by a tribunal of
Palermo on May, 16 1968, following a voluntary bankruptcy petition by ELSI's Board of Directors. 74 Since the amount realized in
the bankruptcy proceedings was not even enough to pay ELSI's
creditors, there was no remainder for Raytheon and Machlett. 75
Although Raytheon had to pay some of ELSI's debts that it had
guaranteed, it succeeded in cases brought by five banks that tried
to hold it liable for some of ELSI's unsecured loans, which were rejected by the Italian Court of Cassation or discontinued by the
claimants.76
The question is whether the ELSI case represents a departure
by the Court from Barcelona Traction. It has been stated that in ELSI
the Chamber accepted "the protection of shareholders of a corporation by the State of their nationality in spite of the fact that the affected corporation had a corporate personality under the defendant State's legislation." 77 However, the Court in Barcelona
Traction expressly recognized that the rights of Belgium could be
affected by an infringement of the rights of Belgian shareholders, 78
and that these had an "independent right of action," 79 but for the
Court it was necessary that the rights (and not just the interests) of
80
such shareholders were affected.
Although the United States' claim referred to the treatment re-

70

Id. para. 13.

71 See id. para. 26 (recounting ELSI's financial problems).
72

Id. para. 30.

73

See id. para 30 (reporting the Mayor's order).

74

Id. para. 36.

Id. para. 44.
Id. para. 45.
77 CMS Jurisdiction, supra note 13, para. 44.
78 See Barcelona Traction, supra note 3, para. 35 (analyzing the right to bring a
claim).
79 Id. para. 47.
80 See id. para. 44 (stating that there can be no claim to compensation when
the "interests of the aggrieved are affected, but not their rights").
75
76
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ceived by Raytheon and Machlett, 81 it should be noted that some of
the measures in question were, at least in principle, aimed at the
rights of ELSI.82 However, it is problematic for several reasons to
regard the ELSI case as an abandonment of Barcelona Traction and
its position with respect to the rights of shareholders under international law.
First, in ELSI it was "common ground between the Parties that
the Court ha[d] jurisdiction... under Article 36, paragraph 1, of its
Statute, and Article XXVI of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation, of 2 June 1948 ('the FCN Treaty'), between Italy
83
and the United States."
Second, among the four acts characterized by the United States
as violations of the treaty, two of them referred to direct rights of
the shareholders as characterized by the ICJ in Barcelona Traction.84
In effect, the United States stated that Italy had "violated its legal
obligations when it unlawfully requisitioned the ELSI plant on 1
April 1968 which denied the ELSI stockholders their direct right to
liquidate the ELSI assets in an orderly fashion" and "when it interfered with the ELSI bankruptcy proceedings." 85 And the other two
acts, allowing ELSI workers to occupy the plant and unreasonably
delaying the ruling on the lawfulness of the requisition, were also
related, in the United States case, to the right of shareholders to orderly dispose of the company's assets. 86 This in turn is closely related to one of the direct rights of shareholders expressly mentioned by the ICJ in Barcelona Traction: "the right to share in the
residual assets of the company on liquidation." 87
Third, the Chamber expressed "doubts whether the word
/property' in Article V, paragraph 1 [providing for "the most constant protection and security"], extends, in the case of shareholders, beyond the shares themselves, to the company or its assets." 88
The Chamber did "nevertheless examine the matter on the basis
argued by the United States that the 'property' to be protected under this provision of the FCN Treaty was not the plant and equip81
82
83
84
85
86
87

ELSI, supra note 34, para. 12.
See id. para. 65 (noting the alleged treaty violations).
Id. para. 48.
Barcelona Traction, supra note 3, para. 47.
ELSI, supra note 34, para. 65.
Id. para. 56.
Barcelona Traction, supra note 3, para. 47.

88 ELSI, supra note 34, para. 106.
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ment the subject of the requisition, but the entity of ELSI itself."8 9
This assertion of the Chamber could provide support for the admissibility of indirect claims under BITs that refer not only to
shares but also to the company as a protected investment, although
in such cases the shareholder will generally have to control the
company in order to bring a claim in relation to the latter's rights.
However, as has been noted, under the ICSID Convention indirect
claims are inadmissible even if they are brought by the controlling
shareholder, unless the mechanism established in Article 25(2)(b)
in fine is resorted to. 90
Finally, in relation to a provision of the applicable FCN that
provided for the right "to acquire, own and dispose of immovable
property or interests therein within the territories of the other High
Contracting Party," the Chamber had to consider an objection by
Italy that the article "does not apply at all to Raytheon and
Machlett because their own property rights ('dirittireali') were limited to shares in ELSI, and the immovable property in question (the
plant in Palermo) was owned by ELSI, an Italian company." 91 The
Court expressed "some sympathy" with the United States position
that opposed the Italian objection, but because the provision included the word "interests" along with the word "property," and
because:
Raytheon and Machlett, being the owners of all the shares,
were in practice the persons who alone could decide (before
the bankruptcy), whether to dispose of the immovable
property of the company; accordingly, if the requisition did,
by triggering the bankruptcy, deprive ELSI of the possibility of disposing of its immovable property, it was really
Raytheon and Machlett who were deprived; and allegedly
in violation of Article VII.92
This last conclusion of the Chamber is quite in line with the distinction made by the Court in Barcelona Traction between rights of
the shareholders and interests of the shareholders, and with the latter's reference to "direct rights of shareholders" among which it included the right to share in the residual assets upon liquidation of

89

Id.

See supra Section 2.
91 ELSI, supra note 34, para. 132.
92 Id.
90
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the company. 93 For all the above reasons, the ELSI case should not
be regarded, at least as a matter of principle, as a departure from
Barcelona Traction on the issue of the admissibility of indirect
claims, and some of the Chamber's conclusions are strictly based
upon the specific language of the applicable treaty.
3.3. The Diallo Case
In a case brought by the Republic of Guinea against the Democratic Republic of Congo ("DRC") the ICJ had occasion to discuss once again the issue of the standing of shareholders with respect to the rights of the company. 94 The case concerns a Guinean
citizen, Mr. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, who resided and made business in Guinea basically through two companies incorporated un95
der Zairean law, Africom-Zaire and Africontainers Zaire.
Mr. Diallo was arrested and deported from Zaire on January
31, 1996, on charges of having breached the public order. 96 Guinea
alleged that the arrest and expulsion of Mr. Diallo were arbitrary,
that he was subjected to humiliating and degrading treatment, that
he was deprived of the exercise of his rights of ownership and
management in respect of the two companies, that he was prevented from pursuing recovery of numerous debts owed to him
and the companies, and that the DRC had failed to pay the debts it
owed to him and to the companies, all in violation of international
law. 97
The DRC objected to the admissibility of the claim inter alia on
the ground that Guinea lacked jus standi to exercise diplomatic protection, since it was essentially seeking to "secure reparation for injury suffered on account of the alleged violation of rights of com98
panies not possessing its nationality."
At the outset, the ICJ noted that Guinea was exercising diplomatic protection in respect of three distinct categories of rights, Mr.
Diallo's "individual personal rights," his rights as partner of the local companies, and "the rights of those companies, by 'substitution.' ' 99 It began its legal analysis of the issue of shareholder's
93

Barcelona Traction, supra note 3, para. 47.

94 See generally Diallo Case, supra note 3.
95

Id. para. 14.

96

Id.

97

Id. para. 11.

98

Id.

99 Id. para. 31.
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standing by reaffirming the principles established in Barcelona Traction, and in particular by stating that "[c]onferring independent
corporate personality on a company implies granting it rights over
its own property, rights which it alone is capable of protecting." 100
Importantly, it confirmed that "what amounts to the internationally wrongful act, in the case of associgs or shareholders, is the
violation by the respondent State of their direct rights in relation to
a legal person, direct rights that are defined by the domestic law of
that State." 101 Those direct rights of shareholders, however, do not
include "the company's debts receivable from and owing to third
parties," 102 which should have a bearing on the issue whether foreign investors have a direct right to claim against measures affecting local companies' receivables (such as payments under contracts).
After rejecting the DRC's objection as to Mr. Diallo's rights as
an individual, 103 in accordance with the doctrine of Barcelona Traction, the Court affirmed the admissibility of Guinea's case as to his
104
direct rights as associ6 of Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire.
Under that doctrine, it also confirmed that at present it cannot be
found "an exception in customary international law allowing for
protection by substitution, such as is relied on by Guinea."1 05 The
Court, however, concluded that Guinea lacked standing to exercise
diplomatic protection as regards measures of the DRC against the
rights of the two companies. 10 6 The Court, nonetheless, made in
passim the following statement:
[I]n contemporary international law, the protection of the
rights of companies and the rights of their shareholders,
and the settlement of the associated disputes, are essentially
governed by bilateral or multilateral agreements for the
protection of foreign investments, such as the treaties for
the promotion and protection of foreign investments, and
the Washington Convention of 18 March 1965 on the Set100 Id. para. 61.
101 Id. para. 64.
102 Id. para. 63.
103 See id. paras. 34-48 (determining that Guinea had standing to espouse Mr.
Diallo's individual rights because the DRC failed to prove the existence of available and effective local remedies that should have been exhausted by him).
104 Id. para. 67.
105 Id. para. 89.
106 Id. para. 94.
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tlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, which created an International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and also by
The
contracts between States and foreign investors ....
theory of protection by substitution seeks indeed to offer
protection to the foreign shareholders of a company who
could not rely on the benefit of an international treaty and
to whom no other remedy is available, the allegedly unlawful acts having been committed against the company by the
107
State of its nationality.
It is important for the purposes of this article to stress that, for
the ICJ, the principle under general international law remains that
shareholders cannot claim against measures affecting the rights of
the company, and that one has to look into specific treaties to find
exceptions to that principle. 108 The ICSID Convention, mentioned
by the Court, provides for such an exception, but only through the
second sentence of Article 25(2)(b).
4.

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ICSID

4.1. The FirstICSID Cases
4.1.1.

Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Republic
of Sri Lanka

Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Sri Lanka concerned
an investment made by Asian Agricultural Products Ltd.
("APPL"), a Hong Kong corporation, in the Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri Lanka. The investment was made in 1983 and consisted in equity capital of Serendib Seafoods Ltd., a Sri Lanka public company. 10 9 This company was in the business of shrimp culture, for which it owned a farm in Sri Lanka." 0
There was some disagreement among the parties as to the exact
percentage of AAPL's share ownership in Serendib Seafoods Ltd.
While AAPL ultimately claimed that it owned 48.2% of the comId. para. 88.
Id. para. 89.
109 Asian Agric. Prod. Ltd. (AAPL) v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3,
Final Award, 4 ICSID Rep. 245,251, para. 3 Uune 27, 1990).
110 Id.
107
108

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol29/iss3/2

2008]

INDIRECT CLAIMS UNDER ICSID

pany's shares, Sri Lanka maintained that A.A.P.C.'s fractional
ownership was much smaller, due to the existence of preference
shares owned by a third party that "should be taken into consideration as an integral part of Serendib's equity capital.""' The Tribunal, however, did not settle the issue; it concluded that "[f]or the
purpose of evaluating the market price of AAPL's shares... the
result would be ultimately the same whether or not" the preference
12
shares were taken into account.
In its counter memorial, Sri Lanka affirmed: "To the extent
there was excessive destruction, the Government of Sri Lanka is
ready to compensate AAPL for its proportionate ownership." 113
There was hence no issue raised as to the admissibility of the claim
in relation to the Claimant's jus standi.
The Tribunal accepted that AAPL was entitled to claim compensation under the Sri Lanka/U.K. Bilateral Investment Treaty
simply on the ground that "the Claimant's 'investments' in Sri
Lanka 'suffered losses' owing to events falling under one or more
of the circumstances enumerated by Article 4(1) of the Treaty
('revolution, state of national emergence, revolt, insurrection',
etc.. .)."114 However, in admitting the indirect action pursued by
AAPL, the Tribunal introduced an important distinction that, as
will be seen, was not expressly reiterated by more recent arbitral
decisions that accepted the admissibility of indirect claims.
The Tribunal clearly stated that the "undisputed 'investments"'
of AAPL in Sri Lanka was its shares in Serendib Company." 5 Consequently, the award concludes that, in the case, the protection
provided by the Treaty did not reach the local company's assets as
such, but that it was "limited to a single item: the value of [the foreign investor's] share-holding in the joint venture entity (Serendib
"
Company).116
In accordance with the AAPL v. Sri Lanka Tribunal's reasoning,
therefore, an investor pursuing an indirect action can only seek
damages for a decrease in the value of its shares that resulted from
a measure attributable to the host state and that violated the applicable BIT. It cannot directly seek damages, for example, for losses
111Id. para. 93.
Id. para. 98.
113 Id. para. 32(E) (quoting Sri Lanka's Counter-Memorial).
114 Id. para. 95.
15 Id.
116 Id.
112
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suffered by the local company on its own investments -although
this, in turn, would probably have an impact on the value of that
company's shares.
It is worth noting that in accepting the claim for damages the
Tribunal indicated that the local company had ceased to be a "going concern" in Sri Lanka-"thus causing AAPL's investment
therein to become a total loss." 117 In the Barcelona Traction case, the
International Court of Justice considered an instance in which a
company, in fact, had ceased to exist. 1 8 However, it concluded
that "[o]nly in the event of the legal demise of the company" can
"an independent right of action" arise for the shareholders." 9
4.1.2.

American Manufacturing & Trading v. Republic of
Zaire

American Manufacturing & Trading Corporation (Zaire), Inc.
("AMT") was an American company, incorporated in the state of
Delaware and controlled by U.S. nationals. 120 AMT's investment in
Zaire consisted in 94% of the stock of a limited liability private
company named Soci~t6 Industrielle Za'roise ("SINZA") Socit6
prive AresponsabilitC limite.121 According to AMT, armed forces
of Zaire had, on September 23-24, 1991 and on January 28-29, 1993,
caused damages to properties and installations belonging to
SINZA, in violation of the BIT signed by the United States of
America and the Republic of Zaire o August 3, 1984.122
In its Counter-Memorial, Zaire challenged the jurisdiction of
ICSID and the competence of the Tribunal inter alia on the ground
that AMT did not have "the capacity to act in the name of
SINZA."123 Zaire affirmed that the dispute was not between AMT
and Zaire but between the latter and SINZA, a Zairian Company,
and that therefore ICSID had no jurisdiction to entertain it.124
Closely related to this objection, Zaire also alleged that, under Zairian law, AMT's claim was inadmissible since AMT had never
Id. para. 99.
Barcelona Traction, supra note 3, para. 66.
119 Id.
120 Am. Mfg. & Trading Inc. (AMT) v. Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1,
Award, 5 ICSID Rep. 11, 14, para. 1.01 (Feb. 10, 1997).
121 Id. para. 1.05(2).
117
118

122

Id.

123

Id. para. 3.09.

124

Id.
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made a direct investment in Zaire, and that SINZA, as the direct
investor, was the only one empowered to institute arbitral proceedings. 125 Zaire even contended that AMT "'is not an investor in the
Republic of Zaire,"' 126 although it later acknowledged that AMT
"'invested by participating in the capital of SINZA."' 127
The Tribunal rejected Zaire's objection on the ground that the
applicable BIT clearly included "'[a] company or shares of stock or
other interests in a company or interests in the assets thereof."' 28
It concluded that "SINZA belongs to AMT 94 per cent and that
AMT, formed in the United States of America with 55 per cent of
its shares owned by United States citizens, is controlled by the
Americans, and hence is a U.S. company." 129 For the Tribunal, that
made SINZA an investment of AMT under the BIT and a juridical
person included in Article 25(2) of the ICSID Convention. 130 With
that, the Tribunal concluded that AMT was acting in its own capacity as an investor in Zaire and not in the name of SINZA, and
therefore it rejected the objection based on the defect in the capacity of the claimant to bring the case. 131
Although the Tribunal did not base its rejection of Zaire's jurisdictional objection on Article III of the applicable BIT, paragraph
2 of that article is an example of the admission of indirect actions
not found in other BITs -which, of course, does not cause the admissibility of indirect claims under the ICSID Convention. Article
III, relating to expropriations and nationalizations, established in
its paragraph 2:
If either Party expropriates the investment of any company
duly constituted in its territory, and if nationals or companies of the other Party hold shares or any recognized right
in the expropriated company, then the expropriating Party
shall ensure that such nationals or companies of the other

126

Id. para. 3.13.
Id. para. 5.08.

127

Id. para. 5.11 (quoting Zaire's reply).

128

Id. para. 5.14.

129

Id. para. 5.15.

130

Id.

131

Id.

125
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Party receive compensation in accordance with the provi32
sions of the preceding paragraph1
4.1.2.

Antoine Goetz et consorts c. R~publique du Burundi

Goetz v. Burundi concerned investments done by Belgian investors in a limited liability company named Affinage des Mtaux, en
abr~g6 AFFIMET ("AFFIMET"), constituted in Bujumbura, Burundi. 133 The 1000 shares of AFFIMET were all distributed between six Belgian nationals, except for one share held by a national
of Rwanda. 3 4 The ICSID arbitration was initiated by all the Belgian shareholders on the basis of Article 8 of the BIT between the
Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and the Republic of Bu35
rundi.1
Burundi had granted a series of fiscal and customs exemptions
to AFFIMET, as well as certain benefits in the fields of labor law
and foreign exchange regulations under a free zone regime. 136
Such benefits were suspended a few months after they were granted 137 and subsequently given back to AFFIMET.138 However, they
were finally withdrawn from AFFIMET on 29 May 1995, following
139
a decision by the Council of Ministers.
It is interesting to note that AFFIMET initiated legal actions before the Administrative Court of Bujumbura, in order to obtain the
annulment of the decision that revoked its benefits under the free
zone regime. 140 The same demand was included in the request for
arbitration, although the latter also included a subsidiary request
for damages. 141 However, the legal actions pursued before the local authorities were initiated in the name of AFFIMET and not in
42
the name of the shareholders.1

132 Am. Mfg. & Trading Inc. (AMT) v. Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Individual Opinions, 5 ICSID Rep. 37, para. 4(ii)(2), (Feb. 21, 1997).
133 Goetz, supra note 6, para. 3.

134 Id.

Id. para. 18.
Id. paras. 1, 5.
137 Id. para. 10.
138 Id. para. 11.
139 Id. para. 15.
140 Id. para. 17.
141 Id. para. 58.
142 Id. paras. 17-18.
135
136
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No jurisdictional objection was raised by Burundi, 143 which basically did not intervene in the proceeding. However, recalling its
duty under Rule 42 of ICSID Arbitration Rules, the Tribunal examined ICSID's jurisdiction and its own competence over the dispute. 1 "
The Tribunal also considered proprio motu the admissibility of
the request, and in this respect it analyzed whether the claimants
had jus standi even if the measure in question was directed to the
company. 145 Responding to a question from the Tribunal, the
claimants explained that the arbitration had been initiated by the
shareholders because the company itself was constituted under the
laws of Burundi and could therefore not have recourse to arbitration against that country pursuant to the ICSID Convention.146
The position adopted by the claimants in this case is very relevant for the purposes of this article. Indeed, the claimants implicitly acknowledged that the rights invoked in the arbitration by the
shareholders were the same rights that the company was invoking
in the local proceedings, although the latter was procedurally
barred from resorting to ICSID arbitration.147
Even though the Tribunal disagreed with part of the claimants'
reasoning, 148 it did not assert the admissibility of the request based
on a supposed distinction between the rights being invoked by the
shareholders and the ones being invoked by the company in local
proceedings. 149 The Tribunal limited itself to observe that ICSID
jurisprudence did not grant jus standi only to the juridical person to
whom the measure was directed but also to the shareholders of
150
such person, who are the "true investors."
It is also important to note that the Tribunal expressly took into

143

Id. para. 78.

144 Id. para. 79.

Id. paras. 86-87.
146 Id. para. 88.
147 Id.
148 Id. (stating "[tihe fact that AFFIMET was a Burundian company did not in
consequence prevent it from lodging the claim for arbitration so long as the Burundian government had given its consent").
149 In fact, for the purposes of the admissibility of the request, the Tribunal
did not attach much relevance to the distinction between AFFIMET and its shareholders. The Tribunal considered that the pre-arbitration consultation requirement under the applicable BIT had been met, even though it had been initiated by
AFFIMET and not by its shareholders. Id. para. 91.
150 Id. para. 89.
145
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account the fact that the claimants in the case were the controlling
shareholders of the company in question. 151 This appears to have
been one of the reasons why it concluded that the request was ad-

missible.152

After the award was rendered, the parties reached an agreement as to the execution of the Tribunal's decision. 5 3 The agreement was concluded between the Republic of Burundi and
AFFIMET, with the latter's shareholders taking no formal part in
it.'54 Furthermore, although the parties in the ICSID proceeding
had been the shareholders and not the company, it was again only
AFFIMET that, pursuant to the terms of the agreement, renounced
any claim it may have had before ICSID or before the courts of Burundi in relation to the object of the international arbitration. 155
This last aspect of the case shows once again that not only the
Tribunal, but also the parties, were aware that the rights in question were the same, albeit invoked by AFFIMET before the local
courts and by its shareholders before ICSID. There was no effort to
create a distinction between rights under the treaty and rights under the local instrument, a distinction that would later be made by
several tribunals in justifying the admissibility of indirect actions.
4.1.3.

Lanco International Inc. v. The Argentine Republic

In Lanco v. Argentina the government had awarded a concession
agreement for the development and operation of a port terminal in
Buenos Aires. 5 6 The agreement had been signed not only by the
local company that was the grantee of the concession, but also by
other companies including the claimant in the ICSID arbitration,
"as awardees and guarantors of the grantee's obligations." 1 57
At the time of the preliminary decision on the jurisdiction of
the arbitral tribunal, Lanco had 17.4% of the capital stock of Terminales Portuarias Argentinas S.A., the grantee of the concession,
151 Id. (citing several cases in which standing was given to strong majority
shareholders of companies).
152 Id.
153 Gortz v. Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Second Part:
The Parties Agreement, 6 ICSID Rep. 46, paras. 1-8 (Dec. 23, 1998).
154 Id. para. 3 (citing Article 3 of the agreement).
155 Id. para. 8.
156 Lanco Int'l Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6, Prelininary Decision on Jurisdiction, 5 ICSID 367, paras. 4-5 (Dec. 8, 1998).
157 Id. para. 5.
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plus "usufruct rights in respect of 13% of the capital stock of that
company." 158 Argentina argued that since the claimant's only investment was its shareholder equity in the grantee company, but
that it was not itself the grantee of the concession, it could not
claim for the performance of the obligations arising under the concession agreement.159
In order to establish its jurisdiction, the Tribunal started by asserting that the claimant had an investment protected under the
Argentina-US BIT.160 It confirmed that shares of stock in a company were an investment, even if such capital stock did not confer
6
control over the administration of the company.1 1
However, the Tribunal also considered it "fundamental" that
Lanco was "a party, in its own name and right, to the Concession
Agreement." 162 This factor differentiates this case from other cases
involving concession agreements, in which the shareholder was allowed to pursue its claim in relation to the agreement even if it was
not a party to it. In light of that circumstance, the Tribunal concluded that the claimant's investment was not only its shares, but
also its participation "in [its] own name and on [its] own behalf" in
1 63
the concession agreement.
Apparently, for the Tribunal, the fact that the claimant had
shares in an Argentine company coupled with its being a party "in
its own name and right" to the concession agreement, was enough
to find jurisdiction, since it did not specifically analyze Argentina's
objection as to the jus standi of the claimant.
As it is argued in this Article, those two factors should be given
completely different weight in determining the admissibility of a
claim by a shareholder. If the shareholder is a party to the agreement in question, he may be claiming for his own rights under
such agreement, and therefore, in that case, the issue of indirect
claims simply does not arise. But the fact that shares are a protected investment under the applicable BIT does not dispose of the
question whether the investor has jus standi, since it will still be
necessary to determine whether the claim genuinely refers to the
rights that such investment confers.
Id.
159 Id. para.
160 Id. para.
161 Id.
162 Id. para.
163 Id. para.
158

7.
10.
12.
13.
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4.2. The Argentine Saga
The economic, political and social crisis suffered by the Republic of Argentina, which exploded at the end of 2001 and during
2002,164 gave way to 30 ICSID cases. 165 The total amount in play in
those arbitrations is so high that it has led some commentators to
affirm that the claims "add up to virtually the total annual budget
166
of the Argentinean government."
Since most of those ICSID cases were brought by investors that
had shares in Argentine companies, and the measures in question
were not aimed at the shareholders' rights, 67 their jus standi under
the ICSID Convention and the applicable BITs was questioned by
Argentina. This in turn has produced the most extensive jurisprudence on the admissibility of indirect claims under international
law that exists so far.
4.2.1.

CMS v. Argentina

CMS v. Argentina concerned an investment by an American
company, CMS Gas Transmission Company ("CMS"), in Transportadora de Gas del Norte ("TGN").168 TGN had been incorporated
in Argentina and in 1992 had obtained a license for the transportation of gas. 169 After two purchases, CMS's shareholding in TGN
reached 29.42% of the company's shares. 70
TGN's license contained certain provisions as to the calculation
and adjustment of tariffs.171 CMS alleged that its "compensation

See, e.g., PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING IN (AND OUT):
WALL STREET, THE IMF, AND THE BANKRUPTING OF ARGENTINA 1 (2005) (describing
the collapse of the Argentine economy following the withdrawal of the IMF mission in early December 2001 and the subsequent political, social, and economic
turmoil that followed in subsequent years).
165 Most but not all ICSID cases against Argentina did diretly arise from the
referred-to crisis. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
List of Concluded Cases, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ (follow "Cases" hyperlink;
then follow "List of Cases" hyperlink; then follow "Concluded Cases" hyperlink).
166 Vaughan Lowe, Some Comments on Procedural Weaknesses in International
Law, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 37, 39 (2004).
167 Although, as it will be seen, the claimants in the Argentine cases affirmed
they were invoking their rights under the BITs and not the rights of the local
companies.
168 CMS Jurisdiction, supra note 13, para. 19.
169 Id. para. 19.
164

170

Id.

171

Id. para. 20.
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claim" was founded "on the loss in value of its investment due to
Argentina's dismantling of the dollar-based tariff regime. " 172 The
measures in question had been adopted by the Argentine government in response to the crisis and included the change of the exchange and monetary policy in effect until the end of 2001.173
Argentina questioned the admissibility of the claim, arguing
that CMS lacked jus standi. In particular, Argentina asserted "that
the Claimant does not hold the rights upon which it bases its
claim-to wit, TGN being the licensee, and CMS only a minority
shareholder in this company, only TGN could claim for any damage suffered." 174 Argentina also alleged "CMS is claiming not for
direct damages but for indirect damages which could result from
its minority participation in TGN." 175
CMS argued inter alia that it was "not claiming for rights pertaining to TGN but for the rights associated with its investment in
the company."'176 CMS further stated that it qualified "as a foreign
investor under the BIT and its participation as a shareholder is a
foreign investment protected under that Treaty, thus having a right
of action independently from TGN" arising "directly from the BIT
provisions." 1 77 Hence, CMS concluded, its claims were "direct and
not indirect." 178
In its Decision on Jurisdiction, in order to deal with Argentina's
objection as to the claimant's jus standi, the Tribunal analyzed the
concept of "[c]orporate personality in Argentine legislation," 179
80
"[sihareholder rights under general international law,"1
"[s]hareholder rights under the ICSID Convention,"'181 and
"[s]hareholder rights under the Argentina-United States Bilateral
Investment Treaty. " 182 Although this Article refers to ICSID's jurisdiction over indirect claims under the ICSID Convention, it is

172 Id. para. 30.
173 Id. paras. 23-24 (discussing the end of the regime of convertibility and parity of the Argentine peso with the U.S. dollar).
174 Id. para. 36.
175 Id.
176 Id. para. 40.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. para. 42.
180 Id. paras. 43-48.
181 Id. paras. 49-56.
182 Id. paras. 57-65.
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useful to consider the analysis done by the Tribunal of Argentine
law, general international law, and the BIT, since such analysis
helps in part to explain why the Tribunal found that ICSID had jurisdiction over CMS's claim.
Regarding corporate personality under the relevant Argentine
legislation, the Tribunal acknowledged that "the corporate legal
personality is distinct and separate from that of the shareholders,"
but stated that "it is not determinant in this case" since national
legislation is not applicable for jurisdictional purposes. 183 The Tribunal did nonetheless consider the Argentine legislation by stating
"that that legislation has contributed significantly to the piercing of
the corporate veil when the real interests behind the corporate personality need to be identified as evidenced for example by Article
54, para. 3, of Law 19.550, as amended by Law 22.903." 184
Article 54, para. 3 of Law No. 19.550 however, refers to the rare
cases in which the activities of the company can be directly attributed to the partners or controllers (or some of them). 185 It has no
relationship whatsoever with the issue of whether shareholders
can claim on their own behalf for alleged violations of the rights of
the company. A reference by the Tribunal to the provisions of Argentine law granting rights to shareholders would have been more
pertinent, instead of alluding to the provision that establishes in
which cases the latter can be liable for damages caused by the
company. 186
As to "[s]hareholder rights under general international law,"
the Tribunal analyzed inter alia the decision of the International
Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction case. 187 It tried to distinguish it from the CMS case by agreeing with the Claimant that Barcelona Traction "was concerned only with the exercise of diplomatic
protection in that particular triangular setting." 188
As will be seen in the discussion of the cases that followed the
CMS decision on jurisdiction, other tribunals would later also dis-

Id. para. 42.
Id. para. 42 (footnote omitted).
185 See Law No. 19.550, Mar. 4, 1972, 25 B.O. 4, art. 54, para. 3.
186 For a discussion of the doctrine of "veil piercing" under customary international law, see Tokios Tokel6s v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision
on Jurisdiction, 11 ICSID Rep. 313, paras. 53-56 (April 29, 2004) [hereinafter Tokels].
187 CMS Jurisdiction, supra note 13, paras. 43-48.
188 Id. para. 43.
183
184
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tinguish Barcelona Traction as a case of diplomatic protection and
therefore distinct from an ICSID arbitration (although Barcelona
Traction has been cited by ICSID tribunals in other contexts). 189 But
the statements of the ICJ in Barcelona Traction in relation to the
rights of shareholders under municipal and international law are
formulated in general and abstract terms, without being made dependent upon the fact that the case concerns an exercise of diplomatic protection. 190
This is not to say that the facts of a case are not important in
order to evaluate the conclusions of the Tribunal as to points of
law. But the CMS Tribunal never explained in what way the assertions of the ICJ in Barcelona Traction as to the rights of shareholders
would have been different had the case not involved an exercise of
diplomatic protection.
The analysis of general international law on this issue concludes with the affirmation that there is "no bar in current international law to the concept of allowing claims by shareholders independently from those of the corporation concerned, not even if
those shareholders are minority or non-controlling shareholders." 191 The problem with indirect claims, however, does not relate
to the issue whether shareholders can claim independently from
the company. No one can seriously question that they can, as long
as they are invoking their own rights and not those of the company.
In Barcelona Traction, the ICJ had already recognized that the
shareholder has an independent right of action, but only
"[w]henever one of his direct rights is infringed ... ."192 It maintained, however, that the shareholder does not have a right of action in regard to "difficulties or financial losses to which he may be
193
exposed as the result of the situation of the company."

Conversely, the CMS Tribunal found that it was "immaterial
for the purpose of finding jurisdiction" whether the investor is a
party to a concession agreement or a license agreement with the
host State "since there is a direct right of action of shareholders." 194
It is clear that the Tribunal is conflating the determination of
189 See Tokeles, supra note 186, paras. 53-56 (ruling that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over the case).
190 See, inter alia, Barcelona Traction, supra note 3, paras. 41-47, 52.
CMS Jurisdiction, supra note 13, para. 48.
192 Barcelona Traction, supra note 3, para. 47.
'91

193

Id.

194 CMS Jurisdiction, supra note 13, para. 65.
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whether shareholders hold a direct right of action, with the issue of
which rights the shareholder can invoke through such action. In
fact, neither in its decision on jurisdiction, nor in the award, did the
Tribunal establish that the rights in play were those of CMS and
not those of TGN.
With respect to " [s]hareholder rights under the ICSID Convention," the Tribunal started by discussing whether the "ownership
of shares" can be considered an investment within the terms of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. 195 It concluded that it can,
even if the shareholders in question do not control or own the ma196
jority of the shares.
The Tribunal then analyzed ICSID's jurisdiction in respect of
indirect investments, taking into account that "[t]he jurisdiction of
the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of
an investment." 197 Citing Fedax v. Venezuela, the Tribunal concluded that the jurisdiction of the Centre extends to direct and indirect investments. 198 In light of those conclusions, the Tribunal
affirmed that "there is no bar to the exercise of jurisdiction in light
of the 1965 Convention." 199
Here again, the Tribunal confused the issues of whether shares
can be an investment under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention
and whether ICSID's jurisdiction can extend to indirect investments, with the determination of which rights a shareholder can
claim. The fact that shares can constitute an investment under the
ICSID Convention and that ICSID's jurisdiction can extend to indirect investments, does not alter (and does not even relate to) the
fact that under the ICSID Convention shareholders are not allowed
to claim for damages suffered by the company.
It is clear that CMS was claiming for the alleged "dismantling"
of a tariff regime that granted rights to TGN, not to CMS, according to the latter's own statements. 200 This is typically an indirect or
49-51.
See id. para. 51 ("There is indeed no requirement that an investment, in
order to qualify, must necessarily be made by shareholders controlling a company
or owning the majority of its shares.").
197 ICSID Convention, supra note 7, art. 25(1).
198 See CMS Jurisdiction, supra note 13, para. 52 (noting the "broad reach that
the term 'investment' must be given in light of the negotiating history of the convention") (quoting Fedax NV v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision
on Objections to Jurisdiction, 5 ICSID Rep. 183, 192, para. 24 (July 11, 1997)).
199 CMS Jurisdiction, supra note 13, para. 56.
200 See id. para. 30 (noting that CMS's compensation claim is founded on the
195 Id. paras.
196
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derivative claim, in which one entity ("CMS") claims compensation
for the alleged infringement of rights pertaining to another entity
(TGN). The Tribunal itself acknowledged that the company affected by the measures was TGN, not CMS.201
It should be stressed once again that even if the applicable BIT
allows for the exercise of indirect claims, 202 this is not determinant
as to the issue whether such claims are permitted under Article 25
of the ICSID Convention. As has already been noted, the "outer
limits" of ICSID's jurisdiction are not subject to the parties' disposition, not even through a BIT.
In the merits phase, the Republic of Argentina raised certain
defenses that bear upon the issue of the admissibility of indirect
claims. In the award, the Tribunal discussed whether the Claimant
had the right to have the tariffs calculated in dollars, 203 obtain tariff
adjustments in accordance with the Producer Price Index of the
United States (US PPI),204 and benefit from the purported stabilization clause in TGN's gas transportation license. 205 In response to
Argentina's position that those rights belonged to TGN and not to
CMS (since TGN was the holder of the license), the Tribunal refused to discuss this topic, stating that it had already been decided
206
in the Decision on Jurisdiction.
It should be noted, however, that the Tribunal never ruled in its
"loss in value of its investment due to Argentina's dismantling of the dollar-based
tariff regime.") (quoting Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, para. 50).
201 Id. para. 113.
202 See id. paras. 57-65 (finding jurisdiction under the specific provisions of
the BIT whether or not the protected is in addition a party to a concession agreement or a license agreement with the host, since there is a direct right of action of
shareholders).
203 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, paras. 127-38, (May 12, 2005), http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC504
_En&caseld=C4 [hereinafter CMS Award] (exploring the argument of CMS that it
had a right to a tariff calculated in American dollars, and the belief of the Argentine Republic that this was not provided for by law).
204 See id. paras. 139-44 (asserting CMS's belief that they had a right to a tariff
adjustment in accordance with the US PPI, which was a significant factor in their
decision to invest in TGN).
205 See id. paras. 145-51 (discussing CMS's belief that they had the right to
stabilization mechanisms under the license).
206 See id. para. 126 (rejecting additional discussion of Claimant's jus standi);
id. para. 132 (rejecting additional discussion on CMS's reliance on TGN's License
since it had been resolved by the jurisdictional decision); id. para. 148 (rejecting
Respondent's contention that beneficiary from the stabilization clause should be
reviewed again in this dispute).
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Decision on Jurisdiction that CMS was entitled to have tariffs calculated in dollars and adjusted in accordance with the US PPI, or to
benefit from stabilization provisions in the License. Furthermore,
in the Decision on Jurisdiction the Tribunal gave clear indications
that it regarded the terms of the License and the rights contained
therein as independent from those of the Treaty. In paragraph 68
of the Decision on Jurisdiction it stated that:
Because ...the rights of the Claimant can be asserted independently from the rights of TGN and those relating to the
License, and because the Claimant has a separate cause of
action under the Treaty in connection with the protected
investment, the Tribunal concludes that the present dispute
arises directly from the investment made and that therefore
20 7
there is no bar to the exercise of jurisdiction on this count.
In paragraph 76 of the Decision on Jurisdiction the Tribunal
also concluded that:
It therefore holds that the clauses in the License or its Terms
referring certain kinds of disputes to the local courts of the
Republic of Argentina are not a bar to the assertion of jurisdiction by an ICSID tribunal under the Treaty, as the func208
tions of these various instruments are different.
In addition, not only did the Tribunal never affirm in its Decision on Jurisdiction, not even prima facie, that CMS had specific
rights under TGN's gas transportation license, but it also referred
to CMS's rights in the following way: "[t]hese rights relate mainly
to fair and equitable treatment and full security and protection, arbitrariness and discrimination, observance of obligations and indirect expropriation without compensation." 209
Finally, in relation with the umbrella clause, Argentina alleged
that "the Claimant can invoke no rights or commitments under the
License as these concern only TGN." 210 When confronted with this
argument, the Tribunal affirmed, as it did when it discussed the
rights under the License, that it would "not discuss the jurisdictional aspects involved in the Respondent's argument, as these

207

CMS Jurisdiction, supra note 13, para. 68.

208
209

Id. para. 76.
Id. para. 114.

210

CMS Award, supra note 203, para. 298.
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were dealt with in the decision on jurisdiction." 211 But again in the
decision on jurisdiction the Tribunal never ruled that the Republic
of Argentina had assumed obligations vis ai vis CMS under the license.
In short, neither the decision on jurisdiction nor the award explained why it was CMS and not TGN that had a right to a tariff
calculated in US dollars, to the adjustment of tariffs in accordance
with the US PPI, and to stabilization mechanisms under the license.
However, from the outset these were the rights being invoked by
CMS, along with the BIT provisions, even if only the latter could
grant rights to CMS. In that way, the real problem caused by the
exercise of indirect claims, i.e., whose rights are in essence being
invoked and who will receive a compensation for an injury to such
rights, was never really discussed, even if the Tribunal ordered the
Republic of Argentina to pay compensation to CMS.212
Argentina sought annulment of the award affirming inter alia
that "the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the case because CMS
was claiming compensation for alleged breaches of rights belonging not to it, but to TGN." 213 The Ad Hoc Committee rejected this
ground of annulment by concluding there had been no excess of
power, 214 since CMS's claims for violations of its rights under the
BIT were within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 215
For reaching its conclusion the Ad Hoc Committee simply noted
that the definition of investment in the BIT was very broad, 216 and
that CMS had made an investment and was an investor within the

Id. para. 299.
The Tribunal also concluded that CMS had to transfer to Argentina the
ownership of its shares in TGN, upon payment by Argentina of an additional
sum. Id. para. 469. Although this unorthodox conclusion might dispel some of
the concerns raised by indirect claims, the state should not be required to acquire
the investment of the investor in order to avoid, for instance, double recovery.
213 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment
of the Argentine Republic, para. 62 (Sept. 25, 2007) (quoting Argentina's
Annulment Memorial, para. 68), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet
?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC687_En&caseld=C4
[hereinafter CMS Annulment].
214 Id. para. 76.
215 See id. para. 75 (asserting that CMS "must be considered an investor
within the meaning of the BIT").
216 Id. para. 72.
211

212
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meaning of the treaty. 217 Accordingly, it could assert causes of ac218
tion under the BIT in connection with its protected investment.
The Committee does not provide a satisfactory explanation as
to the compatibility between the mechanism provided for in Article 25(2)(b) in fine of the ICSID Convention and an indirect claim
brought by a shareholder. 219 It limits itself to observing that
whether the locally incorporated company may claim for the violation of its rights, this "does not affect the right of action of foreign
shareholders." 2 0
Interestingly, however, the Ad Hoc Committee did annul the
finding of the Tribunal on the umbrella clause for failure to state
reasons. 221 Argentina had submitted that it had assumed no obligation to CMS apart from the provisions of the BIT itself, and that
therefore CMS was not in a position to invoke the umbrella
clause. 222
Since the ad hoc Committee did not find it necessary to decide
whether the umbrella clause allowed CMS to enforce TGN's
rights,223 its position on such an interpretation cannot be definitively determined. However, its description of "major difficulties
with this broad interpretation" - which include the fact that "it
would appear that the parties to the obligation (i.e., [sic] the persons
bound by it and entitled to rely on it) are likewise not changed by
reason of the umbrella clause" -suggests that the CMS Ad Hoc
Committee did not favor an interpretation of the umbrella clause
that allows a shareholder to invoke rights that have been conferred
22 4
to the company.
4.2.2.

Azurix Corp. v. Argentina

Azurix Corp. (Azurix), "a corporation incorporated in the State
of Delaware of the United States of America, " 225 first created in
Id. para. 75.
Id.
219 See id. para. 74 (acknowledging that both avenues are open without determining the extent of their compatibility).
217
218

220 Id.
221

Id. para. 97.

222 Id. para. 87.
223 Id. para. 98.

Id. para. 95
Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, 10 ICSID Rep. 413, para. 1 (Dec. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Azurix].
224
225

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol29/iss3/2

20081

INDIRECT CLAIMS UNDER ICSID

Argentina two indirect subsidiary companies. 226 These two Argentine companies were established specifically for making a bid offer
in the privatization of the state company which provided potable
227
water and sewerage services in the Province of Buenos Aires.
After winning the bid, those two Argentine companies incorporated a third one, Azurix Buenos Aires S.A. (ABA), to act as the
concessionaire. 228 The concessionaire had to be a locally incorporated company 229 and would be granted "a 30 year concession for
the distribution of potable water and the treatment and disposal of
230
sewerage in the Province."
Argentina argued that Azurix had no jus standi to bring a claim
in relation to the concession "since it is an indirect shareholder of
ABA."231 Argentina also claimed that Azurix had agreed to the jurisdiction of local courts and waived all other fora, and that
through its alter ego, ABA, it had "made an election under Article
VII of the BIT to submit the dispute to the jurisdiction of the local
232
courts of the Argentine Republic."
In the way it was presented by Argentina, the objection based
on Azurix's agreement to submit disputes to local tribunals was related to the jus standi objection. Argentina argued that Azurix
could not "have it both ways": if it wanted to put forward claims
related to ABA's contractual rights penetrating its juridical personality, it also had to comply with the latter's jurisdictional commitments. 233 If it was claiming only as a shareholder, the jus standi ob234
jection applied.
Probably because Argentina had invoked the Barcelona Traction
precedent, 235 the Tribunal started its treatment of the jus standi objection by making the by now classic (and irrelevant) affirmation in
this discussion that the case did not concern "diplomatic protection
under customary international law but the rights of investors, in226
227

Id. para. 21.
Id. para. 19.

m Id. para. 22.
See id. para. 19 (stating how the concessionaire was required "to be a company incorporated in Argentina.").
230 Id. para. 22.
231 Id. para. 24.
232 Id. para. 23.
233 Id. para. 42.
234 Id.
235 See id. para. 70 (indicating how the respondent based its arguments on the
ICJ Barcelona Traction case).
229
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cluding shareholders, as determined by treaty, namely, under the
BIT. "236

For this Tribunal, "given the wide meaning of investment" in
the Argentina-U.S. BIT, the provisions of the latter "protect indirect
claims." 237 The Tribunal also cited the CMS decision for the statement that "there is a direct right of action of shareholders." 238
It should be noted that Argentina had expressly recognized
that shares were a protected investment, and "that an investor in
shares has standing to activate dispute settlement mechanisms under BITs," 239 so that was not the basis of the objection. The basis of
the objection, which the Tribunal did not address, is that a shareholder cannot put forward claims which essentially involve the
rights of the company, especially under the provisions of the ICSID
Convention.
The Tribunal next considered whether Azurix, given that it was
pursuing an indirect claim in relation to its investment in ABA,
was bound to comply with the latter's contractual obligation to
submit all disputes to local courts. 240 It concluded that in its claim
Azurix was invoking obligations owed to it by Argentina under
the BIT and that such claim was "based on a different cause of action from a claim under the Contract Documents." 241 Hence, Azurix was not required to follow the jurisdictional provisions of the
contract in question, which in any event involved entities different
from the parties to the dispute. 242
It should be noted that, in order to discern whether the claimant is putting forward a direct or an indirect claim-as in order to
discern whether the claim is contractual or is a genuine treaty
claim -it is not enough to take into account that the claimant is invoking its rights under the BIT. The claimant will always allege
that it is its rights that are involved (and not the ones of the company) and that its claim derives from the provisions of the BIT and
not from the provisions of a contract (although the provisions of
the latter may have to be analyzed in the course of decision).
Id. para. 72.
Id. para. 73.
238 Id. (quoting Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI), Judgment (U.S. v. Italy), 1989
I.C.J. 15 (July 20)).
239 Id. para. 69.
240 Id. para. 74.
241 Id. para. 76.
242 Id.
236
237
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But the Tribunal has to undertake its own analysis in order to
verify whether the "essential basis of [the] claim," to borrow the
words of the ad hoc Committee in Vivendi I,243 involves the rights
of the shareholder or those of the company. As a general matter,
whenever the measures in question, be they general or particular,
are directed to the company and its activities, they will affect the
rights of it and not those of its shareholders, although a case by
case analysis is necessary. Very frequently, the Tribunal will have
enough elements to conduct such analysis in the jurisdiction phase.
In the Award the Tribunal stated that "Azurix and the Respondent have no contractual relationship" and that "[tihe obligations
undertaken by the Province in the Concession Agreement were
undertaken in favor of ABA not Azurix." 244 This was important
for the Tribunal in the application of the umbrella clause, since it
concluded that the "underlying premise" of such clause "that a
party to the BIT has entered into an obligation with regard to an
investment.. .is inexistent." 245
Although the interpretation given by the Tribunal to the umbrella clause and to the underlying contract was correct-in that it
required the existence of an obligation undertaken in favor of the
foreign investor and not the local company for the umbrella clause
to be applicable-it is not clear whether such finding is coherent
with the Tribunal's acceptance of the admissibility of indirect
claims. If the foreign investor is allowed to claim a compensation
for breaches of rights that pertain to the company, it is not clear
why it should not be allowed to invoke obligations undertaken in
favor of the company under the umbrella clause.
4.2.3.

LG&E v. Argentina

LG&E v. Argentina involves three companies constituted in the
United States: LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and
LG&E International Inc. (LG&E). 246 The investment of LG&E con243 Compafiia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, 6 ICSID Rep. 340, para. 98 (July 3,
2002) [hereinafter Vivendi II].
244 Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award
para. 52 (July 14, 2006).
245 Id. As a consequence of the inexistence of an obligation entered into "with
regard to an investment,"id., the Tribunal later dismissed Azurix's allegation that
Argentina had breached the umbrella clause. Id. para. 384.
246 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1,
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 11 ICSID Rep. 411, para. 1 (Apr. 30, 2004).
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sisted in "shares in three gas distribution licensees constituted in
Argentina: Distribuidora de Gas del Centro ("Centro"), Distribuidora de Gas Cuyana S.A. ("Cuyana"), and Gas Natural BAN S.A.
247
("GasBan")"
LG&E's claims against Argentina were similar to the ones of
CMS. In fact, LG&E complained for certain measures adopted by
the Republic of Argentina in relation to the way gas distribution
248
tariffs were to be calculated and adjusted.
Argentina questioned LG&E's jus standi because: (a) LG&E's
claims involved the rights of the Argentine licensees and therefore
could only be brought by them; (b) Argentine and international
law provide that the legal personality of shareholders and corporations is distinct, and do not allow shareholders to file claims for indirect damages; (c) the lack of an express provision in the Argentina-U.S. BIT could not be construed as allowing for indirect
claims. 249 It should be noted that Argentina affirmed that its jus
standi objection "is not merely a jurisdictional issue," and that
therefore had to be decided applying not only the ICSID Convention and the BIT, but also Argentine domestic law pursuant to Article 42 of the ICSID Convention.250
In dealing with the jus standi objection, the Tribunal started by
stating that shares were an investment within the meaning of the
BIT, and that it was "irrelevant whether the shares are majority or
minority shares." 251 It also tried to distinguish Barcelona Traction
by affirming that "it concerned diplomatic protection by a State to
its nationals whilst the present case involves the contemporary
concept of direct access to dispute settlement by an investor in investor-State arbitration." 252
As the Azurix Tribunal, this Tribunal cited the CMS case for the
proposition that shareholders have "a separate cause of action under the Treaty in connection with the protected investment," which
can "be asserted independently from the rights of [the company]." 25 3 It concluded by affirming that "the Claimants should be
Id. para. 19.
See id. para. 23 (alleging that various measures taken by Argentina
amounted to a breach of BIT).
249 Id. para. 29.
250 Id. para. 44.
251 Id. para. 50.
252 Id. para. 52.
253 Id. para. 60.
247
248
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considered foreign investors, even though they did not directly opthrough
erate the investment in the Argentine Republic but acted
254
territory."
its
in
purpose
companies constituted for that
This and other cases show that, in the discussion on the admissibility of indirect claims, the issue of whether the shareholder is
bound by the jurisdictional commitments of the company arises
very frequently. 255 The LG&E Tribunal affirmed that the shareholder does not have to follow the jurisdictional provisions of the
contract concluded by the company, since the former is exercising
"acause of action under the BIT." 256 But even if such a proposition
were correct as a matter of principle, it seems unfair to allow the
shareholder not to comply with the contract jurisdictional obligations if, in essence, it is at the same time exercising the contract
rights (although through a mechanism enshrined in a treaty).
In the Decision on Liability, the Tribunal reaffirmed its conclusion as to jus standi.25 7 It also "insisted on the independent treatment of LG&E regarding the licensees, both from the point of view
of the legal personality of each entity and from the actions of
each," 25 8 and stated that "the recognition of the independence
among these entities was the basis on which the jurisdiction of the
259
Centre and the competence of the Tribunal were supported."
However, although formally all Tribunals acknowledge the independence of the shareholder from the company, in the end the admission of indirect claims implies a non-recognition of such independence, since the shareholder is exercising the company's rights
(although not being required to fulfill the latter's obligations).
4.2.4.

Enron v. Argentina

Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. (Enron) commenced two ICSID cases against the Argentine Republic. The first
one, known as Enron I, "concerns certain tax assessments allegedly

254

Id. para. 63.

See id. paras. 61-62 (noting several cases that have discussed similar jurisdictional issues).
255

256

Id. para. 61.

LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1,
Decision on Liability, para. 177 (Oct. 3 2006), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC627En
&caseId=C208.
257

258

Id. para. 79.

259

Id.
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imposed by some Argentinean provinces in respect to a gas transportation company in which [Enron] participated through investments in various corporate arrangements." 260 The second one,
known as Enron II and accepted by the Tribunal as a claim ancillary to the first one,2 61 arose in the words of the Claimant "from the
refusal of the Argentine Government to allow tariff adjustments in
accordance with the United States Producer Price Index ("PPI")
and the enactment of Law No. 25.561 which nullified PPI adjustments and the calculation of tariffs in dollars of the United States of
America." 262 The Tribunal decided to treat separately the issues of
263
jurisdiction arising from both claims.
Enron's claims concerned the Argentine company Transportadora de Gas del Sur ("TGS"), which operates "one of the major networks for the transportation and distribution of gas produced in
the provinces of the South of Argentina." 264 Through two whollyowned companies, EPCA and EACH, Enron owned 50% of an Argentine company called CIESA, which in turn owned 55.30% of the
shares of TGS.265 EPCA, EACH, and ECIL, another corporation
controlled by Enron, also hold 75.93% of EDIDESCA, an Argentine
corporation that owned 10% of TGS's shares, and EPCA had acquired an additional 0.02% of TGS. 2 66 According to Enron, its total
investment amounted to 35.263% of the shares of TGS. 267
In the decision on jurisdiction in Enron I, in light of Argentina's
objection that the case was inadmissible because Enron did not
have the rights upon which it based its claim, 268 the Tribunal stated
that "the essential question is whether the claimant invoking the
benefit of [the BIT's] provisions qualifies as a protected inves-

260 Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision
on Jurisdiction, 11 ICSID Rep. 273, para. 1 (Jan. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Enron I].
261 Id. para. 17.
262 Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision
on Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim), 11 ICSID Rep. 295, para. 8 (Aug. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Enron II].
263 Enron I, supra note 260, para. 17.
264 Id. para. 21.
265
266

Id.
Id.

267 Id. Enron's "evolving structure of ownership" underwent further modifications in 2005 and 2006. See Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic., ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, Award, paras. 53-54 (May 22, 2007) available at: http://icsid
.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp [hereinafter Enron Award].
268 Enron I, supra note 260, paras. 34.
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tor." 269 But the "essential question" as to the admissibility of indirect claims is not whether the claimant qualifies as an investor,
since he may have made a protected investment and still be advancing a claim that involves the rights of another person.
Argentina also argued that the measures in question directly
affected only TGS, and that Enron was only indirectly affected as a
minority shareholder. 270 Since TGS and CIESA were Argentine
companies not controlled by Enron, they did not qualify as an investment or as an investor under the Argentina-U.S. BIT.271 Having invested in shares, Enron could only claim "in respect of measures affecting the shares qua shares, as in the event of expropriation
of the shares or other measures affecting directly the economic
272
rights of the shareholders."
By then, the Enron Tribunal already stated that, in relation to
the standing of shareholders, it did "not intend to discuss again
273
questions that have been amply considered in recent decisions."
It did however affirm somewhat vaguely that the Barcelona Traction
decision was not "controlling in investment claims such as the present one, as it deals with the separate question of diplomatic pro274
tection in a particular setting."
The Tribunal emphasized "that there is nothing contrary to international law or the ICSID Convention in upholding the concept
that shareholders may claim independently from the corporation
concerned, even if those shareholders are not in the majority or in
control of the company." 275 Like other arbitral tribunals that considered the subject, the Enron Tribunal conflated the issue of
whether shareholders can claim independently from the corporation concerned - which nobody seriously contests - with the issue
whether measures directed against the company's rights can give
rise to claims for compensation by the shareholders.
What distinguished the Enron case from previous cases was the
fact Enron was not a direct shareholder in the local company, but
an indirect one. Therefore, the Tribunal found it necessary to ana-

33.
34.

273

Id. para.
Id. para.
Id.
Id. para.
Id. para.

274

Id.

275

Id. para. 39.

269
270
271
272

35.
38.
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lyze whether the principles it had affirmed in relation to claims by
276
shareholders were applicable to such a situation.
The Tribunal, however, started with the usual argument about
the broad definition of investment, and how such definition "does
not exclude claims by minority or non-controlling shareholders." 277
It also stated that the fact that a treaty does not provide for certain
rights of the shareholders does not mean that such rights were excluded from the former treaty if they can be inferred from its provisions. 278 This was because Argentina had argued that "when
treaties have wished to include within their scope indirect damages.., they have done so expressly" - as is the case of NAFTA
and the Algiers Claims Settlement Declaration; so, if the relevant
treaty is silent, indirect claims are inadmissible, given that they are
not permitted under local laws or general international law. 279
It is important to note that the Tribunal expressly stated that
"[w]hether the locally incorporated company may further claim for
the violation of its rights under contracts, licenses or other instruments, does not affect the direct right of action of foreign shareholders under the Bilateral Investment Treaty for protecting their
interests in the qualifying investment." 280 There is no indication
given, however, as to how those two claims could be compatible the one by the shareholder and the one by the company-since if
the shareholder is exercising an indirect claim, a claim by the company in relation to the same measures will inevitably lead to the
state paying twice for the same damage.
This last problem is particularly acute in cases such as the Enron case, where the foreign investor had "invested in a string of locally incorporated companies that in turn made the investment in
TGS." 281 Argentina argued that "this could trigger an endless
chain of claims, as any shareholder making an investment in a
company that makes an investment in another company, and so
on, could invoke a direct right of action for measures affecting a
282
corporation at the end of the chain."
The Tribunal recognized that "there is indeed a need to estabId. para.
Id. para.
278 Id. para.
279 Id. para.
280 Id. para.
281 Id. para.
276

277

282

41.
44.
46.
45.
49.
50.

Id.
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lish a cut-off point beyond which claims would not be permissible
as they would have only a remote connection to the affected company." 2 3 It found that the answer lay in whether the state had
given its consent in respect of the relevant investor and investment, 284 and that Argentina through different instruments had
sought Enron's investment. 285 Therefore, Argentina's consent included Enron, who "cannot be considered to be only remotely
connected to the legal arrangements governing the privatization,"
and instead, "are beyond any doubt the owners of the investment
made and their rights are protected under the Treaty as clearly established treaty-rights and not merely contractual rights related to
286
some intermediary."
This is not the place to discuss whether the Tribunal's conclusion was correct as to the extent of Argentina's consent or as to the
effect that it recognized to certain instruments. Nonetheless, it appears that the Tribunal's proposed "cut-off point" -the consent of
the state-is not satisfactory, at least from a systemic point of view.
In most cases, a direct relationship will not be present between the
host state and a foreign shareholder, in that inter alia such state
will not have granted any specific promises to the latter apart from
those contained in the BIT. But that factor should not prevent the
shareholder to exercise its rights under the BIT, nor should an ample offer of jurisdiction by the state that includes such shareholder
grant him substantive rights that it otherwise does not hold.
An objection made by Argentina "that any remedy would
really have its effect on TGS," was rejected by the Tribunal on the
grounds that "the Claimants are exercising a right in their own capacity under the Treaty which is separate from any rights appurtenant to TGS. Whether a remedy, in addition to protecting the investors' rights, benefits a separate but related corporate entity is
287
not a ground for objection to jurisdiction."
However, in the Enron case the issue was not very problematic,
at least in concrete terms, since if the Tribunal ordered the tax assessments to be cancelled, that would indeed benefit both the
shareholder and the company without placing an illegitimate burden on the state. But the situation is different when the remedy
283
284
285
286
287

Id. para. 52.
Id.
Id. para. 56.
Id.
Id. para. 75.
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sought is essentially monetary compensation, so that if the shareholder has a remedy under the Treaty and the company has a remedy under the contract in relation to the same measure, the result is
double recovery.
In the PPI case, Argentina also raised the issue of Enron's lack
of jus standi and of the inadmissibility of indirect claims. 288 The
Tribunal once again addressed such arguments, albeit briefly,
given that they had "already been discussed in the Stamp Tax Decision." 289
Argentina's concern "that successive claims by minority shareholders that invest in companies that in turn invest in other companies, could end up with claims that are only remotely connected
290 It
to the measures questioned," was rejected by the Tribunal.
found that "there is a clear limit to this chain in so far as the con291
sent to the arbitration clause is only related to specific investors."
However, consent to arbitration through a BIT is anything but specific in relation to the covered investors-the definitions of investment are very broad -so it is difficult to see what the "clear limit"
to endless corporate chains to which the Tribunal refers is.
In this last decision, the Tribunal once again emphasized
that Enron was: [S]pecifically invited to participate in the
privatization process, various companies were set up in
Argentina to this effect and investments were channeled
into TGS through this network of corporate arrangements.
It is simply not tenable to try now to dissociate TGS from
those other companies and the investors and argue that
292
[Enron does] not have ius standi.
This last reasoning seems to be based upon reasons of equity
more than on reasons of law. It seems to suggest that if the host
state invited the foreign investor to make a particular investment,
then it cannot invoke "formalities" in order to leave that investor
without the protection of the BIT. The proposition, however, is
questionable.
The fact that a certain investor does not have access to an inter-

Enron II, supra note 262, para. 14.
289 Id. para. 15.
290 Id. para. 20.
288

291

Id.

292

Id. para. 28.
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national jurisdiction in relation to specific state measures does not
mean that it does not have rights, even under international law. So
the invited investor will have certain rights, though these may not
include certain procedural rights. For a shareholder to have the
right to pursue an indirect claim, it is necessary to show that the
state consented to such action, independently of whether the state
invited it to invest. However, it is worth insisting on the fact that a
state cannot consent to indirect actions within the framework of the
ICSID system.
The Tribunal also stated that the definition of investment of the
Argentina-U.S. BIT, which it affirmed "controls the whole discussion" of Enron's jus standi, "includes the channeling of investments
through locally incorporated companies, particularly when this is
mandated by the very legal arrangements governing the privatization process in Argentina." 293 Here again, the Tribunal conflates
the issue of whether the claimant has a protected investment with
the issue of whether the measure in question affected rights arising
from such investment or only the interests of the investor-for instance, by affecting the rights of somebody else.
It was argued by Argentina that the United States had in Mondev InternationalLtd. v. United States of America ("Mondev") 294 and in
Gami Investments Inc. v. United Mexican States ("Gami")295 affirmed
"that shareholders cannot assert claims under the North American
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") for damages suffered by the
company in which they own shares." 296 The Tribunal noted that
297
the Tribunal in Mondev had "reached a different conclusion,"
and that, in light of a decision of the United States Supreme Court,
it should be understood that the United States view is that minority shareholders deserve protection under bilateral investment
treaties.298
However, there is no contradiction between this last affirmation and the United States' position in Mondev and Gami as the Tribunal seems to suggest. Nobody denies that minority shareholders
Id. para. 30.
Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, 6 ICSID Rep. 292, para. 1 (Oct. 11, 2002).
295 Gami Invs. Inc. v. United Mex. States, Final Award, NAFTA/UNCITRAL
Case (June 30, 2003) (submission of the United States of America).
296 Enron II, supra note 262, para. 34.
297 Id. para. 35.
298 Id. paras. 38-39.
293
294
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are protected under bilateral investment treaties. What minority
shareholders cannot do, unless otherwise expressly provided for in
the BIT, is "assert claims ...for damages suffered by the company
299
in which they own shares."
In the award, which concerns only the Stamp Tax case, because
the PPI case was discontinued following an agreement by the parties, 300 the Tribunal recognized the danger of "double-dipping," or
"double recovery" if two shareholders in different levels of the
corporate chain are compensated for the same harm. 30 1 However,
no criterion is provided as to which shareholder -or which level of
the corporate chain -should be compensated.
Interestingly, the Tribunal addressed an argument by Argentina that if Enron were compensated for non-application of the tariff arrangements and later the licensee obtained a tariff increase,
consumers would end up paying twice for the same interest. 302
However, the Tribunal expressed "the certainty that if the situation
arises or its consequences would end up affecting the tariffs, able
government negotiators or regulators would make sure that no
303
such double recovery or effects occur."
The response by the Tribunal to Argentina's concern is problematic. Avoiding double recovery-a quite questionable result
from the point of view of law and of justice- cannot depend on the
ability of "able government negotiators or regulators" 3 4 and on
the actual existence of ways to avoid it, but should depend on
firm - and already existing - legal principles.
4.2.5.

Siemens v. Argentina

In Siemens v. Argentina, the Claimant, Siemens A.G. ("Siemens"), had established a local corporation, Siemens IT Services
S.A., through its wholly-owned affiliate Siemens Nixdorf Informationssysteme AG ("SNI"). 3°5 The creation of such local company

Id. para. 34.
Enron Award, supra note 267, paras. 26-28.
301 Id. para. 167.
302 Id. para. 211.
303 Id. para. 212.
304 Id.
305 Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision
on Jurisdiction, 12 ICSID Rep. 171, para. 23 (Aug. 3, 2004).
299
300
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was required to participate in a bid for "a contract to establish a
306
system of migration control and personal identification."
The bidding terms also required that the local company, Siemens IT Services S.A. ("SITS"), provide evidence that the sole
owner of its shares, SNI, was wholly integrated and managed by
Siemens, and that "by virtue of law is jointly liable for the obligations that SNI assumes before third parties." 307 SITS won the bid
and it signed the contract with the Argentine government on October 6, 1998.308
The contract was suspended in February 2000 and SITS agreed
to a renegotiation proposal in November 2000. 30 9 The contract was
afterwards terminated by the Argentine government on May 18,
2001, in accordance with the terms of Law 25.344.310
Argentina advanced eight objections to jurisdiction, two of
which referred to Siemens' lack of jus standi.311 The Tribunal decided to consider jointly all the objections that referred to jus
standi.312
In this case, Argentina recognized that indirect claims were
admissible "under Article 4 of the [Argentina-Germany BIT] and
the related Ad Article 4 of the Protocol." 313 In fact, Ad Article 4 of
the Protocol establishes that "[a] claim to compensation shall also
exist when any of the measures defined in Article 4 is taken in respect of the company in which the investment is made and as a result the investment is severely impaired." 314
However, Argentina affirmed that Siemens' claim was inadmissible because it did not hold the shares of SITS, the party to the
contract, and therefore there was not a direct relationship between
the investor and the investment as required by the treaty. 315 Siemens denied that such direct relationship was required by the
treaty. 316

306

Id.

307

Id. para. 24 (citing Request for Arbitration, para. 13).

308

Id. para. 25.

309

Id. para. 26.

310

Id.

311

Id. sec. III.

312

Id. para. 122.
Id. para. 124.

313

315

Id. para. 124 n.105.
Id. para. 123.

316

Id. para. 128.

314
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The Tribunal commenced by affirming that Ad Article 4 of the
Protocol "is used only in the context of expropriation or measures
tantamount to expropriation." 317 It found "that this clause focuses
on damage to the investment directly, or indirectly through measures taken against the company in which the investment has been
made, rather on who may base a claim on it."318 For the Tribunal,
under that provision, "the right to be compensated exists in case of
expropriation and measures having the equivalent effect, and 'also'
in the case of measures directed against the company in which the
319
investment has been made."
The position of the Tribunal is not sustainable. There can be no
doubt that a right to be compensated exists in case of expropriation
and in case of other measures that cause damage in violation of the
BIT, provided that the claim is brought by the holder of the rights
concerned. Hence, the only possible relevance of Ad Article 4 of
the Protocol is precisely as to who can bring the claim, which under that provision can be brought not only by the company in
question but also by somebody who invested in the company, even
if the measure was "taken in respect of the company."
As had been done by the arbitral tribunals that considered the
matter before, the Tribunal denied the relevance of Barcelona Traction and ELSI. 320 The only reason provided by the Tribunal in this
respect was that "[tihe issues before this Tribunal concern not diplomatic protection under customary international law but the
rights of investors, including shareholders, as determined by the
32
Treaty." 1
It should be noted that the Tribunal considered that Siemens
investment was not only in shares, but also consisted of rights
322
emerging from the contract entered into by the local company.
In that way, and without providing any reason whatsoever, the
Tribunal completely disregarded the independent existence, in legal terms, of the different companies involved.

317
318
319
320

Id. para. 138.
Id. para. 139.
Id.
Id. para. 141.

321

Id.

322

Id. para. 150.
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4.2.6.

615

AES v. Argentina

AES Corporation ("AES") submitted a claim against Argentina
regarding its "investment in eight electricity generation companies
323
and three major electricity distribution companies in Argentina."
As most of the cases commenced against Argentina following its
crisis, the case concerned disputes among the parties as to the
regulatory regime applicable to such electricity generation and dis324
tribution companies.
In considering Argentina's argument that "AES ha[d] failed to
prove its status as an investor for the purposes of the US-Argentina
BIT," 325 the Tribunal briefly addressed the issue of the "actual protection of shareholders and that of their jus standi before an ICSID
Tribunal." 326 For the Tribunal, the U.S.-Argentina BIT definition of
investment provides "solid ground for recognizing AES' legal interest as a claimant for alleged losses suffered as a result of its investment in Argentina." 327 Since such definition "is a very wide
one," there is no doubt that AES made an investment in Argen8
tina. 32
Here again, the AES tribunal conflates the discussion as to
whether the claimant made an investment, with the issue of which
rights such investment confers and whether these last rights are the
ones being invoked by the claimant. The Tribunal concludes by affirming that "AES is the proper claimant," 329 without discussing
whether its investment in shares of Argentine companies gave it
the right to receive a reparation for the alleged non-application of
tariff arrangements which granted rights only to such local companies and not to AES.
4.2.7.

Camuzzi and Sempra v. Argentina

Camuzzi International S.A. ("Camuzzi") commenced two arbitrations against Argentina. The first one concerned its "investment
in two natural gas distribution companies which together serve
323 AES Corporation v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, 12 ICSID Rep. 308, para. 1 (Apr. 26, 2005).
324

Id.

Id. para.
Id. para.
327 Id. para.
328 Id. para.
329 Id. para.
325
326

75.
85.
86.
88.
89.
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seven Argentine provinces," 330 in which a decision on objections to
jurisdiction was rendered on May 11, 2005. The second one referred to another investment made by Camuzzi in three electricity
distribution and transport companies, 331 where the decision on jurisdiction was adopted one month later, on June 10, 2005.
For its part, Sempra Energy International ("Sempra") submitted a claim against Argentina concerning the same gas distribution
companies involved in Cammuzzi's first claim. 332 Although Argentina agreed with Cammuzzi 3 33 and with Sempra 334 to set up a
single Tribunal to hear both requests, they were decided separately. In fact, on the same day that it ruled on jurisdiction in Camuzzi's first claim the Tribunal delivered a jurisdictional decision
in Sempra's claim.
In the Sempra decision it is explained that Camuzzi and Sempra owned 56.91 percent and 43.09 percent, respectively, of the
shares of Sodigas Sur S.A. and Sodigas Pampeana S.A., two Argentine companies. 335 In turn, these local companies owned 90 percent
and 86.09 percent, respectively, of the shares in Camuzzi Gas del
Sur S.A. and Camuzzi Gas Pampeana S.A., which held licenses for
the distribution of natural gas in seven Argentine provinces. 336 As
the previous cases involving the Argentine crisis, the dispute concerned regulations adopted in relation to the licensees' tariffs, although Sempra and Camuzzi's claim also involved other measures
regarding subsidies, taxes, levies, payment for services, labor re337
strictions, and transfers of costs applicable to the licensees.
330 Camuzzi International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/2, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 1 (May 11, 2005),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId=DC510_En&caseld=C10 [hereinafter Camuzzi I].
331 Camuzzi International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/7, Decisi6n del Tribunal de Arbitraje sobre Excepciones a la Jurisdicci6n,
para. 1 (June 10, 2005), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request
Type=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC643Sp&caseld=C227 [hereinafter Camuzzi II].
332 Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 5 (May 11, 2005), http://icsid
.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docld=DC509_En&caseId=C8 [hereinafter Sempral.
333 Cammuzzi I, supra note 330, para. 4.
334 Sempra, supra note 332, para. 5.
335 Id. para. 19.
336 Id.
337 Id. para. 20.
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Argentina opposed Sempra's jus standi.338 In treating another
jurisdictional objection, however, and before referring to the one
related to jus standi, the Tribunal alluded to the interpretation of
Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention. 339 It affirmed that this
provision creates an option that allows that the claim to be brought
by the foreign investor or by the local company itself, provided
that the pertinent requirements are complied with. 34 0 For the Tribunal, the "supplementary nature" of the mechanism under which
the local company can submit a claim "is clearly marked by the
word 'and' with which the second sentence of the article begins." 341
For the reasons already expressed, the argument that the
mechanism enshrined in the second sentence of Article 25(2)(b) of
the ICSID Convention is only an alternative for the shareholder is
incorrect. The argument given by the Sempra Tribunal as to the
inclusion of the word "and" is not tenable, since the question there
is not whether such mechanism is different from the case in which
the shareholder is advancing the claim, which clearly is.
The problem is whether the shareholder who invokes a claim
involving the local company's rights can choose between bringing
the claim itself or having the company sue the host state. A proper
interpretation of the Convention leads inevitably to the conclusion
that in that case only the local company can commence an ICSID
arbitration (provided the requirements of the second sentence of
Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention are present), since if not
the mechanism would not have been created as a possibility in the
absence of which the investment would have been left outside of
342
ICSID jurisdiction.
It should also be noted that the Sempra Tribunal resorted to
"corporate law" in deciding an issue concerning the exercise of
control by the foreign shareholders over the local company. 34 3 Indeed, it affirmed that "from the standpoint of corporate law, it is
quite normal that various shareholders might control the policies
and operations of a company through a shareholders' agreement,

338

Id. para. 21.

339 Id. para. 38.

Id. para. 42.
Id. para. 41.
342 Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 2, at 359.
343 Sempra, supra note 332, para. 47.
340
341
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the terms of which are as mandatory as a contract." 3 " However, it
afterwards disregarded corporate law as to legal personality, since
it considered that the definition of investment included in the BIT
was meant "to facilitate agreement between the parties thereby
preventing that the corporate personality of the company might interfere with the protection of the real interests associated with the
345
investment."
In the treatment of the issue of indirect claims, the Tribunal
makes an important admission when it states that it is "theoretically correct" that "if the right of shareholders to claim when only
their interests are affected is recognized it could lead to an unlimited chain of claims ."346 As the Enron Tribunal, however, this Tribunal affirmed that "any claim for derivative damages will be limited by the arbitration clause," and that "'[i]f consent has been
given in respect of an investor and an investment, it can be reasonably concluded that the claims brought by such investor are
' 347
admissible under the treaty.'
Here again, the proposed limitation is far from satisfactory.
BITs provide general definitions of investment and investor, from
which consent to jurisdiction has to be determined. Therefore, in
the absence of an act by which the state can be considered to have
consented to jurisdiction in respect of a specific investor, basically
no limitation to derivative claims can be found in the ample definitions contained in BITs.
The Tribunal rejected the jus standi objection basically by affirming that Sempra could make a claim even though it was a minority shareholder, in light of the BIT's broad definition of investment,348 and by concluding that Sempra's claim was "founded on
both the contract and the Treaty." 349 This last conclusion is not
based upon any explanation as to how Sempra's claim, which refers to issues of tariffs contained in a license, is genuinely a treaty
claim.
There is again an important recognition as to the possibility of
"double recovery for the same harm, one as a result of domestic
contract-based action and the other as the outcome of an interna-

346

Id.
Id. para. 70.
Id. para. 77.

347

Id.

348

Id. paras. 91-93.

349

Id. para. 101.

344
345
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tional arbitral award;" but although the Tribunal states that "international law and decisions offer numerous mechanisms for preventing the possibility of double recovery" it refers to none. 350 In
fact, if compensation is granted to the shareholder on the basis of
the reduction in the value of the company as a result of a measure
that affected the latter's future revenues, 351 it is difficult to see how
double recovery would be avoided if the company presents its own
claim for the loss of such revenues.
The decision on jurisdiction in Cammuzzi's first claim, rendered by the same Tribunal as in Sempra's claim and on the same
day, provides identical reasons to the ones given in the Sempra decision as to indirect losses and jus standi of shareholders. 352 As to
the decision on jurisdiction in Cammuzzi's second claim, the Tribunal, with a different composition than in the first case, affirmed
that Cammuzzi's claim was a direct one since it involved the rights
of the foreign investor under the BIT and not the contractual rights
353
of the concessionaires.
The Tribunal also disregarded the applicability of Barcelona
Traction, since it affirmed that the applicable BIT constituted an
agreement under which Camuzzi was entitled to have immediate
and direct access to an international jurisdiction to claim for the
protection of its rights. 354 The core of the problem presented by
indirect claims, that is whether the shareholder's claim genuinely
involves its rights or the rights of the local company, was never
discussed by this Tribunal. In this sense, it is not enough to state
that the shareholder is invoking its rights under the Treaty (e.g., its
right to receive a treatment that is fair and equitable, etc.), since if
all the measures in question exclusively regulate the rights of the
company, in principle only the rights of the latter will be involved.
The award in the Sempra case presents a troubling derivation
of the admission by Tribunals of indirect claims by shareholders.
The two local companies where Sempra had shares and in respect
of which it had brought the claim, reached agreements with the

Id. para. 102.
See CMS Award, supra note 203, paras. 418-68 (ordering Argentina to pay
$133.2 million to a gas company for failing to meet its treaty obligations).
352 See Cammuzzi I, supra note 330, paras. 45-91 (finding jurisdiction to hear
the claim in spite of arguments against jurisdiction for indirect nature of damages
and lack of jus standi).
353 Cammuzzi II, supra note 331, para. 34(iv).
354 Id. para. 44.
350

351
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government, which provided for tariff increases and "the suspen355
sion and discontinuance of judicial or arbitral claims."
Argentina argued that "the agreements made the claim in this
case inadmissible as the Licensees had accepted a new tariff regime
356
and the investor did not have any separate claim of its own."
For the Tribunal, however, Sempra was still an investor, and it was
in any event not bound by the agreements, which "are to this effect
357
res inter alios acta."
The paradox created by the Tribunal's decisions is that Sempra
was allowed to bring a claim derived from licenses, 358 which were
as to it res inter alios acta (since concluded by the licensees). Notwithstanding that, Sempra's claim was not affected by subsequent
agreements arrived at by the licensees-under which the latter
consented to the measures contested by Sempra and renounced to
all claims in that respect-because the Tribunal considered that
such subsequent agreements were res inter alios acta!
Further, the Tribunal specifically addressed the possible double
recovery "resulting from, on the one hand, the compensation
which the investor would receive as a result of arbitration and, on
the other hand, the compensation which the company would receive in the context of a renegotiated adjustment of tariffs or some
other mechanism." 35 9 For the Tribunal, double recovery was not
likely "since Government negotiators will make sure that any recovery obtained from one source is not duplicated by means of a
separate recovery from another source," 360 as in fact it had happened in the case through an indemnity agreement obtained by the
361
government of Argentina from the Licensees.
It should be stressed once again that the avoidance of double
recovery in the context of indirect claims by shareholders cannot

355 Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16, Award, para. 224 (Sept. 28, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docd=DC694
_En&caseld=C8 [hereinafter Sempra Award].
356 Id. para. 225.
357 Id. para. 227.
358 It cannot be denied that the claim basically derives from the licenses and
other instruments only addressed to the licensees, and from measures regulating
such licenses and instruments, notwithstanding the fact that Sempra in turn invokes the provisions of the Treaty in relation to those measures.
359 Sempra Award, supra note 355, para. 395.
360 Id.
361

Id.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol29/iss3/2

INDIRECT CLAIMS UNDER ICSID

20081

depend, as a general matter, on the ability of government negotiators to obtain appropriate compensation from the local companies
or possibly from non-claiming shareholders, and on the latter capacity and willingness to provide such compensation. Double recovery has to be avoided through legal considerations (such as
who is the owner of the affected rights, who is entitled to compensation, etc.), and not through contingent factors that may or may
not be present.
4.2.8.

Gas Natural SDG v. Argentina

Gas Natural SDG S.A., a company incorporated in Spain, submitted a claim before ICSID regarding the impact of Argentina's
emergency measures on its investment, which consisted of an indi362
rect shareholding in an Argentine gas distribution company.
The Tribunal posed "to the parties three preliminary questions relating to the jurisdiction of the Centre," before the claimant submitted its memorial on the merits and even before Argentina raised
363
jurisdictional objections.
In its decision "on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction" the
Tribunal analyzed claimant's standing. 364 Interestingly, in affirming that the claimant had a protected investment under the Argentina-Spain BIT as a shareholder in an Argentine corporation, it
stated:
The rights appertaining to shareholders under the law pursuant to which the corporation is organized are, as the second paragraph of Article 1(2) states, subject to the law of Argentina. That law would determine, for example, how
shareholders' meetings are convened, how directors are
elected, what accounts must be maintained, etc. 365
The Tribunal, however, concluded that Gas Natural SDG S.A.
had standing to claim the impairment of the value of its shares as
the protected investment, and that that gave rise to an investment

362 See Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/10, Decision of the Tribunal on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction,
para. 9 (June 17, 2005), http://asil.org/pdfs/GasNat.v.Argentina.pdf (introducing
claimant Gas Natural and its investment at issue in the arbitration).
363 Id. para. 5.

364 See id. para. 32 (laying out the arguments from each side regarding standing).
365 Id. para. 34.
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dispute under the BIT. 366 Clearly, the Tribunal failed to see that the
problem with indirect claims is not the existence of an investment
but the rights in play in the claim. Moreover, while it seemed to
suggest that the rights of shareholders protected by the BIT are
those conferred by local law (i.e., the direct rights of shareholders
recognized in Barcelona Traction), it nevertheless affirmed the admissibility of a claim which plainly did not refer to those rights but
to the rights of the local licensee.367
4.2.9.

Vivendi v. Argentina

The famous Vivendi case was commenced by Compaffia de
Aguas del Aconquija S.A., an Argentine company, and Compagnie
G~n~rale des Eaux (afterwards Vivendi), a French company, 368 in
relation to a water and sewage concession in the Argentine province of Tucumdn. 369 A first award in the case was rendered on November 21, 2000, which was partially annulled by an ad hoc Committee on July 3, 2002,370 leading to a resubmission of the case on
August 29, 2003.371
The second Tribunal rendered a Decision on Jurisdiction on
November 14, 2005.372 There it rejected the objection that one of
the claimants could not claim because its claim "constitutes a derivative claim forbidden by Argentine and international law." 373
Although the Tribunal considered that the issue was res judiId. para. 35.
Of course, the claimant alleged that the impact on certain rights of the licensee resulted in a reduction of the value of the investor's shares, which in any
event is an indirect claim par excellence. See id. para. 17.
368 See Compaffia de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, para. 1 (Nov. 21, 2000), http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docd=DC548
_En&caseld=Cl59 [hereinafter Vivendi I] (providing the procedural history and
background of the case).
369 Id. para. 25.
370 See Vivendi II, supra note 243, paras. 1-3.
371 Compaia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, para. 1.1.7 (Aug. 20, 2007), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/ VivendiAwardEnglish.pdf [hereinafter Vivendi Award].
372 Compaffia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No.
ARB/97/3,
Decision
on Jurisdiction,
(Nov. 14, 2005),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AgueasVivendijurisdictiondecision.pdf
[hereinafter Vivendi Jurisdiction].
373 Id. paras. 88-94. In the award, the Tribunal confirmed that the companies
that had brought the claim were the "proper claimants" in the proceedings. See
Vivendi Award, supra note 371, para. 11.1(i).
366

367
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cata, having been decided by the first Tribunal and "endorsed by
the ad hoc Committee," 374 it nevertheless briefly analyzed the issue.
It disposed of the objection basically by affirming that shareholders, whether majority or minority, are investors under the ICSID
Convention and the Argentina-France BIT,375 and shares are an in376
vestment under these instruments.
Since shareholders are investors and have an investment, the
Tribunal affirmed that they have a right to pursue a claim alleging
a BIT breach with respect to those investments. 377 The Tribunal, as
several other Tribunals that considered the issue before, wrongly
considered that the problem with derivative claims is whether
shareholders have an "independent right of action."
4.2.10. Continental v. Argentina
Continental Casualty Company ("Continental") is a U.S. company that invested in an Argentine insurance company called CNA
Aseguradora de Riesgos del Trabajo S.A. ("CNA ART").378 Initially, Continental acquired a 70% interest in the local company
and later acquired a 99.995% interest. 379 In its ICSID claim, Continental complained of the emergency measures adopted by Argentina, including the "pesification" of certain assets, "restrictions on
transfers," and "rescheduling of cash deposits."380
Argentina affirmed that the claim did not involve a legal dispute because Continental was "not the holder of the legal rights
"
that it alleged have been breached by the Argentine Republic. 381
It also questioned Continental's jus standi "since the investment of
the Claimant consists in shares of an Argentine company, while the
measures have affected the Argentinean corporation of which the
Claimant is a shareholder ... ,,382 Continental seemed to recognize that the measures concerned not its rights, but those of the local company, but it affirmed that it is "now well settled that an inVivendi Jurisdiction, supra note 372, para. 89.
Id. para. 90.
376 See id. paras. 91-93 (stating that the applicable definition of investment
explicitly includes shares).
377 Id. paras. 93-94.
378 Continental Jurisdiction, supra note 11, para. 1.
379 Id. para. 22.
380 Id. para. 25.
381 Id. para. 37.
382 Id. para. 52.
374

375
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vestor may bring an investor-state claim under the BIT for measures interfering with the legal rights of its Argentine subsidiary
and not just for measures affecting the investor's shares in the sub383
sidiary."
Like its predecessors, the Tribunal started the treatment of the
jus standi objection by considering whether the claimant had a protected investment under the Argentina-U.S. BIT. 38 4 However, it
then made the following affirmation:
These provisions warrant an interpretation of the BIT according to which, in case of an acquisition by an investor of
one Contracting Party of the entire capital of a company of
the other Party, the treaty protection is not limited to the
free enjoyment of the shares, that is the exercise of the
rights inherent to the position as a shareholder, specifically
a controlling or sole shareholder. It also extends to the
standards of protection spelled out in the BIT with regard
to the operation of the local company that represents the
385
investment.
The position of this Tribunal appears not to coincide with the
position adopted by tribunals in previous jurisdictional decisions.
In fact, the Continental Tribunal affirmed that "the treaty protection
is not limited to the free enjoyment of the shares," and "also extends to the standards of protection spelled out in the BIT with regard to the operation of the local company that represents the investment," but "in case of an acquisition by an investor of one
Contracting Party of the entire capital of a company of the other
Party... *" 386
The Continental decision suggests that in the case of a noncontrolling shareholder "the treaty protection is ... limited to the
free enjoyment of the shares, that is the exercise of the rights inherent to the position as a shareholder." 387 This Tribunal made a dis-

Id. para. 53.
Id. para. 78.
385 Id. para. 79.
386 Id.
387 Id. In paragraph 81 the Tribunal reaffirms this position by stating that,
different from the case of portfolio (i.e., non-controlling shareholding) investment,
"in case of acquisition of a company established in the other country the scope of
[the BIT's] application is not merely limited to the ownerships of the shares." Id.
para. 81.
383

384
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tinction between sole or controlling shareholders and noncontrolling shareholders, which was not introduced by other Tribunals and which entails that indirect claims by the latter are inadmissible.
The Tribunal stated that the admissibility of indirect claims, albeit by sole or controlling shareholders, "is supported by the object
and purpose of the BIT."388 It further affirmed that "[d]isregard of
the actual treatment of the company representing the investment,
by removing it from the BIT coverage would therefore require a restrictive interpretation of the BIT's terms contrary to its object and
purpose" and would "render most of its provisions ineffective and
useless for investors .... "389
These statements by the Tribunal appear to be de lege ferenda
expressions, more than an objective description of how the law
stands. BITs are not human rights instruments conferring fundamental rights on investors, and the fact that investors cannot bring
certain types of claims does not mean that their rights cannot be
protected in other fora. Although it is true that the majority of foreign investment is channeled through local companies, this type of
investment is made voluntarily by the investor (even if the state
requires the incorporation of a local company, because the investor
can always decide not to make the investment). This characteristic
of modern foreign investment cannot alter the decision of the BIT's
state parties as to whether to admit indirect claims.
In any event, the Tribunal concluded that "[tihe claims of Continental cannot therefore be defined as indirect claims (or 'deriva390 It
tive' claims)," because Continental was invoking treaty rights.
nonetheless affirmed that "not any and all action by the host State
that causes a damage or prejudice to the assets of the local company automatically and necessarily represents an indemnifiable
treaty breach." 391
For the Tribunal, compensation under the BIT only proceeds if,
apart from a treaty breach, damages to the local company's assets
"amount at the same time, quality or quantity wise, to an injury
caused to the very investment of the foreign investor." 392 The Tribunal here seems to forget that for purposes of admissibility of the
388

Id. para. 80.

389

Id.

390

Id. para. 87.

391 Id. para.
392

89.

Id. para. 89(a).
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claim it is not determinant, as recognized by the ICJ in Barcelona
Traction, whether a certain measure causes an injury to the claimant, but whether or not such measure refers to the latter's rights.
4.2.11. SAUR International v. Argentina
This case concerns an investment by a French investor, SAUR
International ("SAURI"), in an Argentine company, Obras Sanitarias de Mendoza S.A., providing water and sewage services in
the Argentine province of Mendoza. 393 SAURI acquired a minority
stake in the concessionaire, consisting of two different types of
394
shares, through three local companies.
In the Decision on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal notes that SAURI
was not a party to the water and sewage concession contract. 395
However, it also notes that SAURI entered into a technical assistance contract with the concessionaire, under which SAURI was to
provide technical assistance as the technical operator of the conces6
sion. 39
Importantly, the Tribunal agreed with Argentina that BITs do
not provide protection against fluctuations in the value of
shares. 397 While stating that the measures in question had been
adopted in relation to the concessionaire and not its shareholders,
for the Tribunal the question was whether such measures had resulted in a violation of SAURI's rights under the Argentina-France
BIT.398

As had been expressly accepted by Argentina, the Tribunal
noted that indirect shareholdings were an investment expressly
protected under Article 1.1.b) of the BIT.399 It also stressed that
SAURI was not exercising the contractual rights of the local company but its own rights under the Treaty. 400
When faced with perhaps the most difficult problem posed by
indirect claims, that is, that the payment of damages will not go to
the holder of the rights but to another party, the Tribunal simply
393 SAUR Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4, Decision on
Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 2 (Feb. 27, 2006).
394 Id. para. 19.
395 Id.
396

Id.

397

Id. para. 79.
Id. para. 81.
Id. para. 87.
Id. para. 89.

398
399
400
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reiterated its position that SAURI was demanding damages under
the BIT and not under the contract. 401 This statement, however, is
not acceptable, since claimants in these types of cases always require payment of damages for the earnings that, but for the measures, the local company would have received under the contract
(or at least for the reduction of the value of the company produced
after such earnings reduction).
4.2.12.

Metalpar v. Argentina

Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire S.A., two companies incorporated
in the Republic of Chile, commenced arbitration against Argentina
in relation to their investment in an Argentine company dedicated
to the fabrication of vehicles for public transportation. 402 The claim
essentially concerns Argentina's emergency legislation adopted at
the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002.403 However, in contrast
to most of the ICSID cases brought against Argentina, this case
does not concern a contract between a local company and the government, but contracts between the Argentine company Metalpar
Argentina S.A. and private parties.
As to jus standi, the Tribunal affirmed that indirect investments
are protected by the Argentina-Chile BIT and that their owners are
entitled to bring an ICSID claim. 404 It further stated that it agreed
with previous arbitral decisions that shareholders can bring for405
ward claims for damages suffered in their indirect investments.
The Tribunal did not consider it necessary to provide additional
reasons for its conclusion on jus standi, other than stating that the
claimants had made an investment, which gave them the right to
invoke the ICSID protection, 406 an assertion that does not address
the objections that have been raised in relation to indirect claims.

401 Id. para. 92. The Tribunal does, however somewhat contradictorily, acknowledge that the development of the relationship between the concessionaire
and the government may have an impact on the damage suffered by SAURI. Id.
para. 93.
402 Metalpar S.A. y Buen Aire S.A. v. Repdlblica Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/5, Decisi6n Sobre Jurisdicci6n Dictada, para. 1 (Apr. 27, 2006),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Metalpar-Argentina-Jurisdiction.pdf.
403 Id. paras. 24-27.
404 Id. para. 65.
405 Id. para. 62.
406 Id. para. 68.
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4.2.13. Telef6nica v. Argentine Republic
Telef6nica S.A. ("Telef6nica"), a Spanish corporation, brought
an ICSID claim against Argentina in relation to its 97.91% shareholding of Telef6nica de Argentina S.A. ("TASA"), an Argentine
corporation. 407 The claim derives from Argentina's emergency
measures concerning telephone tariffs to be charged by the local
company and the compatibility of such measures with the Argentina-Spain BIT.408
As had been done by the Tribunal in Continental v. Argentina,40 9
the Telef6nica Tribunal distinguished between an "acquisition by an
investor of one Contracting Party of the entire capital of a company
of the other party, [where] treaty protection is not limited to the
free enjoyment of the shares," and the case of minority shareholders, on which it reserved its position.410 Making such a distinction,
however, does not seem to be justified unless some consequence
stems from it as to the scope of treaty protection.
The Tribunal also stressed that "the legal regime applicable to
TASA's operations was the object of an undertaking by Argentina
with Telef6nica" and that Telef6nica's "claim is therefore not
barred by the fact that TASA may be the legal holder of certain of
those rights and connected obligations under the laws of Argentina." 411 However, leaving aside of course instruments where the
foreign investor is itself a party, the fact that the state was interested in obtaining foreign participation in a certain investment
does not in principle change the legal nature of the channels
through which the investment was made.
Further, the Tribunal's conclusion that it was "competent to entertain claims that measures affecting the legal regime of TASA's
operations have breached Telef6nica's rights under the BIT" 412
does not provide any indication as to how to distinguish between

407 Telef6nica S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/20, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 11 (May 25, 2006) [hereinafter Telef6nica].
408 Id. paras. 12-14.
409 See Continental Jurisdiction, supra note 11, para. 79 (holding that "in [the]
case of an acquisition by an investor of one Contracting Party of the entire capital
of a company of the other Party, the treaty protection is not limited to the free enjoyment of the shares").
410 Telef6nica, supra note 407, para. 76.
411 Id. para. 80.
412 Id. para. 81.
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the rights of TASA and the rights of Telef6nica (either under the
Treaty or under the telephony license). For example, does the license belong to both of them or just to TASA, its holder? In the
event of a measure that is considered to have breached the license
as well as the Treaty, are both companies to receive compensation?
The Tribunal's previous conclusion that the company itself
should be considered the investment, 413 can provide some basis for
414
affirming that Telef6nica can claim for injuries to TASA's rights,
even though the conclusion was not based upon the ArgentinaSpain BIT, which differs from other BITs in that it does not include
corporations within protected investments. 415 However, it does
not solve the problem of ICSID's jurisdiction, because the fact that
the foreign shareholder controls the local company (which is to be
considered the investment according to the Telef6nica Tribunal) is
precisely one of the requirements contained in the second sentence
of Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention that allows the local
company - and not the shareholders - to sue the host state.
Faced with the objection raised by Argentina as to jus standi,
the Tribunal denied that Telef6nica's claim was indirect or derivative 416 because
Telef6nica asserts its own treaty rights for their protection,
regardless of any right, contractual or non-contractual, that
TASA might assert in respect of such assets and rights under local law before the courts of competent jurisdiction of
Argentina for damages suffered as a consequence of actions
taken by those authorities in breach of applicable provi417
sions of such law.
It seems that for the Tribunal, certain assets and rights may be
held at the same time by Telef6nica under the Treaty and by TASA
under local law, although no explanation is given as to which
company is entitled to compensation when an asset -upon which

Id. para. 75.
Still, much will depend on the intention of the parties to the BIT as to
whether it can be established that solely through listing corporations among the
protected investments they intended to allow indirect claims by shareholders.
415 See Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments
(with Protocol), Arg.-Spain, art. 1(2), Oct. 3, 1991, 1699 U.N.T.S. 202 (defining "investments" for purposes of the treaty).
416 Telef6nica, supra note 407, para. 90.
417 Id. para. 89.
413
414
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both companies hold rights under different titles - is affected by a
418
measure.
4.2.14. Suez et al. v. Argentine Republic
In 2003 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A., and an Argentine
company, Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A. ("APSF"), commenced proceedings against Argentina. 419 The claim referred to investments made by the claimants "in a concession for water distribution and waste water treatment in the Argentine Province of
Santa Fe" and the alleged refusal by Argentina to apply certain tar420
iff adjustments to the concession.
On January 11, 2006 the local company, which was the concessionaire, 421 withdrew its claim. 422 APSF had initiated its proceeding through Article 25 of the ICSID Convention and Article (1)(2)(c)
of the Argentina-France BIT.423
Argentina submitted a jurisdictional objection stating that
"Suez, AGBAR, and InterAguas, as mere shareholders of APSF are not
legally qualified to bring claims in ICSID arbitrationfor alleged injuries
done to APSF."424 In its decision on jurisdiction, the Tribunal began
the consideration of this objection by affirming that the claimants'
"shares in APSF are 'investments' under the Argentina-France and
Argentina-Spain BITs"425 and that therefore they were "entitled to
have recourse to ICSID arbitration to enforce their treaty rights." 426
Furthermore, the Tribunal stated that the distinction between
shareholders' direct-as opposed to derivative -claims, which is

418 It appears that according to the Tribunal's reasoning, both companies
would be entitled to compensation, one under local law and the other one under
the Treaty. This result, however, makes double recovery inescapable.
419 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 1 (May 16, 2006),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val-showDoc&docld=DC514_En&caseId=Cl8 [hereinafter Suez Jurisdiction].
420

421

Id.
Id. para. 23.

422 Id. para. 16.
423 Id. para. 39.
424

Id. at 24 (Fifth Jurisdictional Objection).

425

Id. para. 49.

426

Id.
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"present in [the] domestic corporate law of many countries, does
427
not exist in any of the treaties applicable to this case."
As to Argentina's concern about the danger of double recovery,
the Tribunal simply noted it and expressed its belief that "any
eventual award in this case could be fashioned in such a way as to
prevent double recovery." 428 The Tribunal gave no indication,
however, as to how the award would be fashioned so that granting
compensation to the shareholders for measures directed to the
company's rights would not result in double recovery.
Moreover, the Tribunal concluded that the withdrawal of the
local company from the case "vitiates any concerns about a possible double recovery to the shareholders and the corporation for the
same injury." 429 It should be noted, however, that the presence of
the corporation as a party in the case is perhaps one of the few
ways in which double recovery can be avoided in these cases, since
then the Tribunal can precisely determine whose rights are in play
and grant compensation to the company if only its rights, and not
those of the shareholders, have been affected.
The parallel case, commenced on the same day by Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., Vivendi Universal
S.A., AWG Group Ltd., and Aguas Argentinas S.A. ("AASA") and
with the same Tribunal, concerned "a concession for water distribution and waste water treatment services in the city of Buenos Aires and some surrounding municipalities." 430 As in the APSF case,
before the decision on jurisdiction the local company, AASA,
431
withdrew its claim.
The Tribunal, in its decision on jurisdiction of August 3, 2006,
rejected Argentina's objection about the capacity of the shareholders to bring the claim on essentially the same grounds as the APSF
Tribunal. 432 On Barcelona Traction, the Tribunal commented that
433
the decision "has been criticized by scholars over the years."
However, the recent ratification by the ICJ of the Barcelona Traction
427

Id.

Id. para. 51.
Id.
430 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. & Vivendi Universal
S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Jurisdiction,
para. 1 (Aug 3, 2006), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request
Type=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC518_En&caseId=Cl9.
431 Id. para. 18.
432 Id. paras. 46-51.
433 Id. para. 50.
428
429
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principles as to rights of shareholders under international law 434
suggests that, notwithstanding the criticisms referred to by the Tribunal, that decision is still good law.
4.2.15. Pan American et al. v. Argentina
This case involves two claims, the first one by Pan American
Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company, 435 and the
second one by BP America Production Company, Pan American
Sur S.R.L., Pan American Fueguina S.R.L., and Pan American Continental S.R.L,436 which were consolidated with the agreement of
the parties. 437 The investments in question were made in the electricity and hydrocarbons sectors, 438 and the claimants complained
439
of Argentina's emergency measures.
As to Argentina's objection concerning the inadmissibility of
indirect claims by shareholders, the Tribunal commenced its analysis by stating that "there is, under general international law, some
doubt on the subject" whether the issue really pertains to the merits and should not be treated in the jurisdictional phase.440 It concluded, however, contrary to the claimant's submission, that it
would consider the issue together with the rest of the jurisdictional
objections. 441
The Tribunal noted that the claimants had established their investor status and therefore had standing to bring claims, including
the local companies under Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention.44 2 It did, however, refer to the problem of the jus standi of foreign shareholders as having "a long but uncertain past in interna443
tional practice."
434 See Diallo Case, supra note 3, para. 86.

435 Pan Am. Energy LLC & BP Argentina Exploration Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13; BP Am. Prod. Co., Pan Am. Sur SRL, Pan
Am. Fueguina, S.R.L. & Pan American Continental SRL v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/8, Decision on Preliminary Objections, para. 1 July 27,
2006),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/PanAmericanBPJurisdiction-eng.pdf
[hereinafter Pan American].
436 Id. para. 3.
437 Id. para. 4.
438 Id. paras. 18-19.
439 Id. para. 27.
440 Id. para. 209.
441 Id.
442 Id. para. 213.
443 Id. para. 214.
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Regarding claims by shareholders, the Tribunal distinguished
between "direct claims (e.g., concerning the payment of dividends)" and "indirect rights." 444 It stated that the home state of the
shareholders could not claim regarding the latter's indirect rights,
unless "the shareholders' indirect rights had become direct... as a
result of the winding up of the company." 445
It also referred to the tendency to allow for an exception when
the measures in question had been taken by the state of which the
company was a national. 446 However, the Tribunal noted that the
ICJ in Barcelona Traction ruled out "at the level of general international law, claims made on behalf of foreign shareholders' indirect
interests."447
For the Tribunal, however, the applicable treaty-the Argentina-U.S. BIT -deviated from Barcelona Traction by allowing claims
based on foreign direct or indirect shareholdings. 448 But the Tribunal never explained: (a) whether the fact that direct and indirect
shareholdings are protected necessarily means that indirect claims
are authorized; (b) if so, why do some BITs expressly provide for
indirect claims, apartfrom protecting direct and indirect shareholdings while others, such as the Argentina-U.S. BIT, do not provide
for indirect claims; or (c) whether the ICSID Convention authorizes
indirect claims outside of the possibility provided for in the second
sentence of Article 25(2)(b).
Interestingly, the Tribunal recognized that "[tihe danger of
double recovery by the Claimants, and, conversely, double jeopardy for the Respondent may be rather real. Actually, in the present case, there may even be triple recovery/jeopardy." 449 It also
noted the danger posed by indirect claims of shareholders to other
shareholders, creditors, and employees, but concluded that this
threat does not authorize it to refuse jurisdiction since shareholdings are a protected investment. 450 With respect to these two issues, the Tribunal lost sight of the fact that, in the regimes that do
444 Id.

Id.
Id. para. 215. The Tribunal refers to the El Triunfo case. See Award of Arbitrators, Given on May 8, 1902, (U.S. v. El Sal.), 15 R.I.A.A. 467, 468-69 (1966)
(awarding damages to the United States to be paid by the Republic of El Salvador).
447 Pan American, supra note 435, para. 216.
448 Id. para. 217.
449 Id. para. 219.
450 Id para. 220.
445

446
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authorize indirect claims, the compensation if any will generally go
to the company, thereby excluding any possibility of double recovery or prejudice to other shareholders or creditors of any sort.
The Pan American Tribunal seemed to recognize that the claimants were exercising an indirect claim, although it concluded that
these claims were permissible under BITs protecting shareholdings. Such recognition is important because, in rejecting the incorrect assertion that these claims are direct, due to their invocation of
rights under the Treaty, it at least contributes to the discussion of
the subject (although its ultimate conclusion is erroneous).
4.2.16. Total v. Argentina
Total S.A. ("Total") is a French company that "has made a
number of investments in Argentina in the gas transportation, hydrocarbons exploration and production and power generation industries." 451 Argentina contested its jus standi to bring the claim
"because, according to a well-known principle of both international and Argentine law, a company's shareholders cannot bring a
452
claim to redress the impairment of rights of the company itself."
In its response to that objection, among other arguments, Total
alleged that the BIT's definition of investment "was meant to
enlarge the jurisdictional protection available to investors pursuant
to the ICSID Convention." 453 It is clear, however, that a BIT simply
cannot enlarge the "outer limits" of ICSID's jurisdiction.
The Tribunal, after rejecting the applicability of Barcelona Traction, 454 concluded that Total was not actually advancing a derivative or indirect suit. 455 In fact, it was invoking its own rights under
the Argentina-France BIT regardless of any right under domestic
law of the local companies in which it holds shares. 456
The distinction that the Tribunal introduces between claims
under domestic law of local companies on one side, and claims
under the BIT of foreign investors on the other, is however not dispositive of the issue of indirect claims. Domestic law will be often
451 Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on
Objections to Jurisdiction, para. 9 (August 25, 2006).
452 Id. para. 33.
453 Id. para. 38.
454 Id. para. 78. The Tribunal asserts that Barcelona Traction is only relevant in
the context of customary international law, and not under BIT law. Id.
455 Id. para. 81.
456 Id.
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(if not always) relevant in the determination of what rights the foreign investor acquired with its investment (which in turn is protected by the BIT457). And, if the claim involves local rights that do
not belong to the claimant, the claim will be inadmissible, even if
those rights could potentially also be protected by a BIT.
4.3. Consorzio Groupement L.E.S.I. - DIPENTA v. Algeria
Consorzio Groupement L.E.S.I. - DIPENTA ("Consortium"),
the claimant in the case, was a consortium formed in Italy by two
Italian companies, Lavori Edili Stradali Industriali L.E.S.I. S.p.A.
("Lesi") and GRUPPO DIPENTA COSTRUZIONI S.p.A.
("Dipenta"). 458 The Claimant alleged an expropriation of its investment under Article 4.3 of the Algeria-Italy BIT. 459
Algeria questioned Consortium's jus standi, essentially because
it did not hold any right under the contract in question, the parties
to which were only Lesi and Dipenta. 460 Importantly, this objection bore on the Tribunal's competence rather than on the admissi461
bility of the claim.
The Tribunal commenced its analysis of the objection by recognizing that the parties to the contract were not identical to the
party that had submitted the request for arbitration. 462 Further,
neither party contested that the claimant, Consortium, had the capacity to hold rights and initiate judicial proceedings. 463
For the Tribunal, it was evident that it had no competence over
the claim since it had been brought by a subject of law that was not
party to the contract to which the claim referred. 464 The following
is the crucial passage of the decision in this respect:

457 See, e.g., EnCana Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, London Ct. of Int'l Arb.
Case No. UN3481, Award, para. 184 (Feb. 3, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/EncanaAwardEnglish.pdf.
458 Consorzio Groupement L.E.S.I.-DIPENTA v. Algeria, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/08, § I, para. 1 (January 10, 2005), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC645_En
&caseId=C228 [hereinafter L.E.S.I.-DIPENTAI.
459 Id. § I, para. 47(v).
460 Id. § II, para. 35(iii).
461 Id. § II, para. 34.
462 Id. § II, para. 37.
463 Id. § II, para. 37(ii).
464 Id. § II, para. 37(iv)-(v).
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I1 est 6vident pour le Tribunal arbitral qu'il ne peut entrer
en matire sur une rclamation si celle-ci lui est soumise
par un sujet de droit qui n'est pas li par le contrat sur lequel elle repose. L'affirmation est si essentielle qu'elle n'a
pas besoin d'Ctre sp~cialement documente. Peu importent
les liens 6conomiques qui peuvent exister entre les entreprises; ainsi, la socit6-m~re ne pourrait r~clamer des prestations revenant contractuellement A sa socit&fille, mme si
celle-ci d6pend totalement d'elle, A moins de circonstances
tr!s particuli~res qui ne sont pas all~gu&s en l'esp&e. Ce
sont ces parties qui ont choisi de recourir pour des motifs
qui leur appartiennent A des structures juridiques diff6rentes; elles ne peuvent ensuite demander A l'autre partie d'en
465
faire purement et simplement abstraction.
It is clear that the existence of economic links between the
companies did not affect the Tribunal's conclusions. In fact, it expressly negates the possibility of a controlling company claiming
payments for a wholly-owned subsidiary. 466 Since the claimant
was not party to the contract through which the investment was
made, not only did the Tribunal have no competence, but also the
claimant could not be considered an investor in the terms of Article
467
25(1) of the ICSID Convention.
The conclusions of the Tribunal seem to be a fortiori applicable
to claims brought by shareholders in relation to the rights of their
company. In this case the parties to the contract were the individ468
ual companies (through a consortium with no legal personality)
and the case was brought by a consortium composed of the same
469
companies with legal personality (at least to a certain extent),
while in the case of the typical indirect claims, the party to the contract is the company and the case is brought by its shareholders. It
cannot be denied that a company is "more separated" or is "more
independent" from its shareholders than a consortium from its
members.

465 Id. § II, para. 37(iv). See also id. § II, para. 39(ii) (noting that the Consortium must respect the rights and obligations of the contracts it signs).
466 Id. § II, para. 37(iv).
467 Id. § II, paras. 37(iv), 40(ii).
468 Id. § II, para. 37(i).
469 Id. § II, para. 37(ii).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol29/iss3/2

2008]

INDIRECT CLAIMS UNDER ICSID
5.

637

CONCLUSION

Claims by or on behalf of shareholders in relation to damages
suffered by the company are inadmissible under general international law. 470 They are also inadmissible under the ICSID Convention, which provides for the protection of foreign shareholders
against measures affecting local companies, but only through the
471
mechanism of Article 25(2)(b) infine.
ICSID jurisprudence, however, has basically accepted the admissibility of indirect claims, 472 with very few exceptions 473 or limitations. 474 This jurisprudence is inconsistent with the position of at
least some states. 475 Further, if indirect claims fall outside the
"outer limits" of ICSID, as this article affirms in Section 3, this cannot be modified by ICSID Tribunals, given the "subsidiary" charac476
ter of jurisprudence as a source of international law.
The ICSID cases that have admitted indirect claims present
several inconsistencies as to their theoretical foundations. For ex-

470 See supra Section 3. But c.f. Int'l Law Comm'n, Fourth Report on Diplomatic
Protection, para. 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/530 (Mar. 13, 2003) (endorsing the view
that "the State of incorporation of a company enjoys the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the company").
471 See supra Section 2 (exploring the ICSID Convention).
472 See supra Section 4 (examining the jurisprudential history of the ICSID); see
also Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3,
Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 174 (Apr. 22, 2005), http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC642
_En&caseId=C224 (pointing to previous according decisions by the ICSID that
minority and non-controlling shareholders have a right "to claim independently
of a separate corporate entity for the measures that affect their investment").
473 See L.E.S.I.-DIPENTA, supra note 458, § III, para. 1 (holding that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction over the dispute in question). For a recent rejection of at
least certain types of indirect claims in a non-ICSID context, see Vladimir Berschader & Mofse Berschader v. Russian Federation, Arbitration Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Case No. 080/2004, Award, paras. 114-150 (Apr. 21,
2006).
474 See Continental Jurisdiction, supra note 11, para. 79 (apparently limiting
indirect claims to controlling shareholders).
475 See Gami Final Award, supra note 27, para. 11 (noting the position of the
United States in its submission pursuant to Article 1128 of NAFTA); see also supra
Section 4.2 (discussing Argentina's objections to ICSID jurisdiction).
476 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38.1(d), June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1031, 1060 available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index
.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0 (providing that the Court shall apply "subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law").
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ample, most consider that shareholders are not really exercising
indirect claims because they are invoking their own rights, 477 while
some seem to accept the indirect nature of the claim but regard it
478
as admissible under the ICSID system.
However, the most troubling aspect of this jurisprudence is
that it leaves the most acute problems posed by indirect claims
without resolution. In this respect, several tribunals have acknowledged the danger of double recovery when ordering the
payment of compensation to a shareholder for measures directed
against the company in which the shareholder has shares. 479 None,
however, has suggested a satisfactory solution, and the alternatives
that have been mentioned are quite ad hoc, contingent on the facts
480
of each case, and not based upon legal principles.
Apart from the issue of double recovery, the non-acceptance of
indirect claims "is also critical to ensuring that creditors' rights
with respect to the investment are respected." 481 Indeed, if the
compensation corresponding to revenues lost by the company goes
not to itself but to its shareholders (and maybe not to all of them),
what happens with all the other parties that may have a legitimate
interest in the company's assets? Isn't that an expropriation of the
company that may have prejudicial effects not only on those third
parties but also on non-claiming shareholders and the company itself? Is it admissible for the shareholder to collect such compensa-

477 See, e.g., Telef6nica S.A. v. Argentine Republic, supra note 407, para. 90;
Camuzzi II, supra note 331, para. 34(iv).
478 See Pan American, supra note 435, para. 217 (noting the applicability of the
ICSID and BIT Conventions, not necessarily general international law); Azurix,
supra note 225, para. 73 (citing the relevant BIT and judicial decisions concerning
this BIT, as well as judgments related to similar BITs); Goetz, supra note 6, para. 89
(considering admissibility issues with respect to shareholder claims).
479 See Sempra Award, supra note 355, para. 395 (explaining that the Tribunal
believes double recovery is not likely due to government efforts); Enron Award,
supra note 267, para. 167 (preventing additional, eventual compensation because it
would constitute a double recovery); Pan American, supra note 435, para. 219 (noting the existence of a double recovery problem, and perhaps triple recovery); Suez
Jurisdiction, supra note 419, para. 51 (recognizing the hazard of double recovery);
Sempra, supra note 332, para. 102 (acknowledging the problem of double recovery).
480 Enron Award, supra note 267, para. 212; Sempra Award, supra note 355,
para. 395.
481 Gami Invs., Inc. v. United Mex. States, Submission of the United States of
America, NAFTA/UNCITRAL Case, para. 17 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June 30,
2003), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22212.pdf.
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tion without bearing any responsibility as to the company's debts,
for example, because the latter has gone bankrupt?
All these legal and policy problems can be avoided if tribunals,
when faced with an indirect claim, determine its genuine nature
and do not order compensation to the shareholder-claimant in such
a case. In this situation, the ICSID Convention affects the jurisdiction of ICSID, but this determination does not necessarily have to
be done in the jurisdictional phase of a proceeding, because it
might be necessary to go to the merits of the dispute to ascertain
whose rights are really in play.
Moreover, protection of foreign shareholders through established mechanisms that admit indirect claims under certain conditions, such as Article 25(2)(b) in fine of the ICSID Convention, does
not create as serious problems. Resorting to these measures is an
effective way to secure such protection and to further the development of international investment law, without creating legal perplexities that may diminish the confidence of states in this important area of international law.
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